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Organizational Justice and 
Antidiscrimination 
Bradley A. Areheart† 
  INTRODUCTION   
Despite nearly eighty years of governmental attempts to 
stamp it out, discrimination in the workplace has proven unre-
lenting.1 The news is littered with stories of xenophobia, misog-
yny, and racism.2 In addition to these clear examples of explicit 
 
†  Associate Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law. For help-
ful conversations and astute insights regarding various iterations of this article, 
I would like to thank Blair Bullock, Jessica Clarke, Katie Eyer, Adam Feibel-
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Sperino, and Daiquiri Steele. I would also like to thank the law faculties at Lou-
isville and Tulane, where I presented earlier versions of this article. I am espe-
cially grateful for help from my talented research assistants: Katelyn Dwyer, 
Dave Hall, Benjamin Merry, and Grant Williamson. Final thanks goes to the 
hardworking editors at Minnesota Law Review. Copyright © 2020 by Bradley A. 
Areheart.  
 1. The governmental effort to address employment discrimination can be 
dated as far back as the executive order FDR signed in 1941 to prevent defense 
contractors from discriminating on the basis of “race, creed, color, or national 
origin.” Exec. Order No. 8802, 3 C.F.R. § 957 (1938–1943). 
 2. See, e.g., DeNeen L. Brown, Allegations of Racism That Divided a Mar-
yland Town Remain Unresolved, WASH. POST (Jan. 6, 2019, 5:00 PM), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/local/allegations-of-racism-that-divided-a-maryland 
-town-remain-unresolved/2019/01/04/df042c48-049f-11e9-9122-82e98f91ee6f_ 
story.html [https://perma.cc/BGG8-ATTA]; Sam Dean, Allegations of Sexism 
and Harassment Roil Riot Games, the Developer of ‘League of Legends,’ L.A. 
TIMES (Oct. 14, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/business/technology/ 
la-fi-tn-riot-games-culture-20181014-story.html [https://perma.cc/QXE2 
-5XTH]; Lauren Hepler, Menial Tasks, Slurs and Swastikas: Many Black Work-
ers at Tesla Say They Faced Racism, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2018), https://www 
.nytimes.com/2018/11/30/business/tesla-factory-racism.html [https://perma.cc/ 
W2R9-QK6H]; Douglas Jacobs, We’re Sick of Racism, Literally, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/11/opinion/sunday/sick-of 
-racism-literally.html [https://perma.cc/8P5L-BX6J]; Silicon Valley’s Sexism 
Problem, ECONOMIST (Apr. 15, 2017), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/ 
  
1922 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [104:1921 
 
bias, we also know more than we once did about implicit bias3 
and the way in which it can, for example, predict racial dispari-
ties in employment.4 In nearly every industry there are striking 
imbalances in professional achievement along protected class 
lines.5 Such incongruities suggest that, in the American work ex-
perience, a person’s success is impacted by forces beyond just 
hard work. One reason for that has been the shortcomings of an-
tidiscrimination law.6 The last decade has spawned an extensive 
amount of legal and social science research that helps explain 
the failure of such laws and discrimination’s persistence.  
Legal scholars have responded to the failures of employment 
discrimination law by proposing changes to these laws—often 
 
04/15/silicon-valleys-sexism-problem [https://perma.cc/2QUC-YSAA]; Heidi 
Stevens, It’s Official: 2016 Is the Year of Xenophobia, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 29, 2016, 
11:53 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/columns/heidi-stevens/ct 
-xenophobia-word-of-the-year-balancing-1129-20161129-column.html [https:// 
perma.cc/GJH4-5878]. 
 3. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive 
Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. 
L. REV. 1161, 1164–65 (1995) (arguing that many biased employment decisions 
are cognitive, rather than motivational, in origin); see also MAHZARIN R. BANAJI 
& ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT: HIDDEN BIASES OF GOOD PEOPLE 34–
52 (2013) (detailing findings of the Implicit Association Test). 
 4. See L. Song Richardson, Systemic Triage: Implicit Racial Bias in the 
Criminal Courtroom, 126 YALE L.J. 862, 876 (2017) (“[A] meta-analysis of 
122 implicit bias studies found evidence that implicit racial biases predict racial 
disparities in employment and healthcare.”). 
 5. See, e.g., Katherine T.U. Emerson & Mary C. Murphy, Identity Threat 
at Work: How Social Identity Threat and Situational Cues Contribute to Racial 
and Ethnic Disparities in the Workplace, 20 CULTURAL DIVERSITY & ETHNIC 
MINORITY PSYCHOL. 508, 512–13 (2014) (identifying racial disparities in high-
status positions in Fortune 100 companies, among others); Karen I. Fredriksen-
Goldsen et al., Support of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Content in 
Social Work Education: Results from National Surveys of U.S. and Anglophone 
Canadian Faculty, 47 J. SOC. WORK EDUC. 19, 25–27 (2011) (identifying gender 
discrimination in the field of social work); Aasim I. Padela et al., Religious Iden-
tity and Workplace Discrimination: A National Survey of American Muslim Phy-
sicians, 7 AJOB EMPIRICAL BIOETHICS 149, 149 (2016) (identifying religious 
identity discrimination among medical practitioners); Damon J. Phillips, Or-
ganizational Genealogies and the Persistence of Gender Inequality: The Case of 
Silicon Valley Law Firms, 50 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 440, 440 (2005) (identifying gender 
disparities in Silicon Valley law firms); Ming-Te Wang & Jessica L. Degol, Gen-
der Gap in Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM): Cur-
rent Knowledge, Implications for Practice, Policy, and Future Directions, 29 
EDUC. PSYCHOL. REV. 119, 128 (2017) (identifying gender disparities in science, 
engineering, technology and mathematics education and workplaces). 
 6. See infra notes 40–47 and accompanying text. 
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doctrinal reforms that would enable more plaintiffs to survive 
summary judgment motions and reach the trial stage.7 These ap-
proaches are understandable, and even laudable. However, in 
light of the compelling evidence showing that people are gener-
ally unwilling to attribute workplace outcomes to discrimina-
tion,8 it stands to reason that neither judges nor legislators are 
likely to view discrimination as widespread enough to justify im-
plementing such reforms.9 There are other challenges too, such 
as many legislators’ commitment to protecting business inter-
ests and the difficulty of achieving the political will needed for 
any major action in the realm of antidiscrimination law.10 Un-
surprisingly, most legal scholars advocating legislative or inter-
pretive reform are quick to acknowledge the political difficulty of 
actually achieving such reforms.11 Moreover, even if antidiscrim-
ination laws were construed to give plaintiffs better odds of 
reaching trial, the psychological account of discrimination attrib- 
 
 7. See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism 
in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 
CAL. L. REV. 997, 1061–62 (2006) (proposing courts employ psychological science 
when considering the consequences of doctrinal decisions); Sandra F. Sperino, 
Rethinking Discrimination Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 69, 115 (2011) (advocating 
abandoning current frameworks in Title VII cases); Charles A. Sullivan, The 
Phoenix from the Ash: Proving Discrimination by Comparators, 60 ALA. L. REV. 
191, 238 (2009) (arguing courts should allow comparator proof as an alternative 
to the McDonnell Douglas framework); Michelle A. Travis, Recapturing the 
Transformative Potential of Employment Discrimination Law, 62 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 3, 92 (2005) (advocating for courts to interpret antidiscrimination stat-
utes consistent with their transformative objectives). 
 8. This general tendency is discussed in greater depth in Parts I.A.1–2. 
 9. See Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the 
Limits of Anti-Discrimination Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1330 (2012). 
 10. One example of this dynamic is found in the oft-proposed, never-passed 
“Employment Non-Discrimination Act,” which would prohibit employment dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity. Some version 
of this statute has been introduced in almost every Congress since 1974, but 
even when the Democrats have had control, it failed to pass. Employment Non-
Discrimination Act, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Employment_ 
Non-Discrimination_Act [https://perma.cc/N8CQ-ETRZ] (last updated Jan. 10, 
2020). Or consider the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 
which did eventually pass, but took thirteen years, during which all of “the con-
troversial provisions were either deleted, revised, or clarified.” Mark A. Roth-
stein, GINA at Ten and the Future of Genetic Nondiscrimination Law, 48 HAS-
TINGS CTR. REP. 5, 5 (2018). 
 11. E.g., SANDRA F. SPERINO & SUJA A. THOMAS, UNEQUAL: HOW AMER-
ICA’S COURTS UNDERMINE DISCRIMINATION LAW 168 (2017) (acknowledging the 
“difficult, if not impossible” prospects for Congressional reform of antidiscrimi-
nation law). 
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ution casts doubt on whether decision-makers would ultimately 
resolve critical questions of fact in a way that benefits plain-
tiffs.12  
The law is positioned largely to react to discrimination—not 
to prevent or even reduce it.13 But legal recourse is a distant sec-
ond to the ultimate goal: preventing discrimination in the first 
place. Surprisingly, workplace policy measures that might seem 
beneficial for prevention—such as antibias training, limiting 
managerial discretion in hiring, and harassment reporting 
mechanisms—are failing and, in some cases, are actually wors-
ening bias.14 An increasing number of scholars have observed the 
limited potential to effect norm change in the workplace through 
legal or policy coercion.15 Well-intentioned strategies like diver-
sity or antibias training may have the perverse effect of actually 
 
 12. Eyer, supra note 9, at 1331–32 (“If, however—as the findings of psy-
chology scholars suggest—most people are predisposed to minimize the likeli-
hood of discrimination, the ‘close calls’ are likely to predominantly be made in a 
manner unfavorable to discrimination litigants. Over time, the accretive nature 
of the law means that results—even if originally bolstered by a particular doc-
trinal reform—will ultimately come to resemble roughly the state of affairs that 
we currently face, with discrimination litigants facing extremely difficult 
odds.”). 
 13. TRISTIN K. GREEN, DISCRIMINATION LAUNDERING: THE RISE OF ORGAN-
IZATIONAL INNOCENCE AND THE CRISIS OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY LAW 47–48 
(2017) (showing how employer liability revolves largely around a system of 
“complaint and response”).  
 14. See, e.g., LAUREN B. EDELMAN, WORKING LAW: COURTS, CORPORA-
TIONS, AND SYMBOLIC CIVIL RIGHTS 155–56 (2016) (observing that symbolic 
structures can “mask” discrimination by creating an illusion of fairness); 
GREEN, supra note 13, at 112–13 (observing that “diversity trainings can rein-
force stereotypes,” “trivialize discrimination,” “engender anger,” and reduce the 
numbers of women and minorities in management); Frank Dobbin & Alexandra 
Kalev, Why Diversity Programs Fail and What Works Better, HARV. BUS. REV., 
July–Aug. 2016, at 55 [hereinafter Dobbin & Kalev, Diversity Fail] (“Trainers 
tell us that people often respond to compulsory courses with anger and re-
sistance—and many participants actually report more animosity toward other 
groups afterward.”); Frank Dobbin & Alexandra Kalev, Why Doesn’t Diversity 
Training Work? The Challenge for Industry and Academia, 10 ANTHROPOLOGY 
NOW 48, 49–51 (2018) [hereinafter Dobbin & Kalev, Diversity Challenge] 
(“[T]rainees often leave ‘confused, angry, or with more animosity toward’ other 
groups.”). 
 15. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good on Good Intentions: The 
Critical Role of Motivation in Reducing Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95 
VA. L. REV. 1893, 1903 (2009) (suggesting aggressive legal strategies may back-
fire when it comes to implicit bias); Eyer, supra note 9, at 1279–80 (noting pro-
posals to broaden the legal doctrines of antidiscrimination laws may “exacerbate 
the documented tensions between prevailing public views and available 
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activating stereotypes and increasing “moral licensing,” a phe-
nomenon in which doing something positive allows one to worry 
less about subsequently doing something negative.16 Trainings 
for diversity or harassment can also undermine people’s senses 
of “autonomy, competence, relatedness, and basic goodness”—
causing such programs to backfire.17 There has been a leap in 
logic from understanding discrimination as a problem to assum-
ing the prevailing treatments will succeed; but “[u]nderstanding 
the cause of malaria and understanding its treatment are two 
different things.”18 What is needed to address the situation today 
are less coercive, empirically-verified approaches to inequality.  
This Article argues that one promising way forward is found 
in the principles of Organizational Justice, a body of literature 
that stems from equity theory.19 Organizational Justice empha-
sizes moral propriety regarding how employees are treated.20 Its 
founders have defined it as “the extent to which an aspect of the 
organizational environment is perceived as fair, according to a 
 
claims”); Lisa Legault et al., Ironic Effects of Antiprejudice Messages: How Mo-
tivational Interventions Can Reduce (But Also Increase) Prejudice, 22 PSYCHOL. 
SCI. 1472, 1476 (2011) (demonstrating “that strategies urging people to comply 
with antiprejudice standards are worse than doing nothing at all” and that “so-
cial control elicited a reflexive, reactive effect that increased prejudice”). 
 16. Dobbin & Kalev, Diversity Challenge, supra note 14, at 49–51 (showing 
antibias training can activate and reinforce stereotypes, as well as increase 
“moral licensing,” which can in turn make workers less likely to self-censor and 
more likely to act badly). 
 17. Bartlett, supra note 15, at 1961; see also infra notes 282–84 and accom-
panying text (explaining in detail why diversity programs are prone to fail). 
 18. Alexandra Kalev et al., Best Practices or Best Guesses? Assessing the 
Efficacy of Corporate Affirmative Action and Diversity Policies, 71 AM. SOC. REV. 
589, 591 (2006); see also Legault et al., supra note 15, at 1472 (observing “[p]ol-
icymakers in North America spend billions of dollars annually on prejudice in-
terventions, yet very few of these are actually based on sound evidence”). 
 19. Equity theory generally posits that judgments of inequity or injustice 
derive from comparing oneself to others based on the ratio of “inputs and out-
comes.” Organizational Justice, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Organizational_justice [https://perma.cc/3LEV-FTTV] (last updated Jan. 6, 
2020). For more discussion of equity theory and related theoretical models for 
better understanding Organizational Justice, see Kjell Törnblom & Ali Kazemi, 
Distributive Justice: Revisiting Past Statements and Reflecting on Future Pro-
spects, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE IN THE WORKPLACE 15, 26–29 (Russell 
S. Cropanzano & Maureen L. Ambrose eds., 2015). 
 20. See Russell Cropanzano et al., The Management of Organizational Jus-
tice, 21 ACAD. MGMT. PERSPECTIVES 34, 34 (2007). 
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certain rule or standard.”21 The field of Organizational Justice is 
generally thought to sub-divide into three sets of work-related 
concerns: (1) what people receive (distributive justice); (2) the 
standards, rules, and processes under which people receive (pro-
cedural justice); and (3) how people are treated along the way 
(interactional justice).22 Ultimately, Organizational Justice is 
not concerned with positive or negative outcomes at work, but 
rather with whether the outcomes or treatments are fair.23 Or-
ganizational Justice asks whether members of an organization 
have been treated justly and whether they have received what 
they deserve.24  
More specifically, it is the position of this Article that Or-
ganizational Justice can do the work of antidiscrimination. 
When workers feel their organization is unfair, they are likely to 
feel resentful or envious, producing “action tendencies”25 that 
 
 21. Carolina Moliner et al., Challenges for an Organizational Justice Re-
search Agenda, in ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 
AND CONCEPTUAL ADVANCES 1, 1 (Carolina Moliner et al. eds., 2017). 
 22. Id. Interactional justice is often further divided into interpersonal jus-
tice, which concerns the treatment of employees by supervisors or managers, 
and informational justice—a concern characterized by the “quality of infor-
mation employees obtain from communications with their supervisors or man-
agers.” Yoon Jik Cho & Na Sai, Does Organizational Justice Matter in the Fed-
eral Workplace?, 33 REV. PUB. PERSONNEL ADMIN. 227, 230–31 (2012).  
 23. Russell S. Cropanzano & Maureen L. Ambrose, Organizational Justice: 
Where We Have Been and Where We Are Going, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JUS-
TICE IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 19, at 3, 3–4. 
 24. Organizational Justice was first developed as a focus of academic in-
quiry in the 1980s and has since grown into a robust field of research. See Jerald 
Greenberg, A Taxonomy of Organizational Justice Theories, 12 ACAD. MGMT. 
REV. 9, 10–15 (1987) (categorizing fields of research that have informed organ-
izational justice as a field); infra note 48 (listing recent anthologies devoted to 
organizational justice). 
 25. See NICO H. FRIJDA, THE EMOTIONS 71 (1986) (“Emotions are action 
tendencies. More fully: Emotions are tendencies to establish, maintain, or dis-
rupt a relationship with the environment.”); James J. Gross & Ross A. Thomp-
son, Emotion Regulation: Conceptual Foundations, in HANDBOOK OF EMOTION 
REGULATION 3, 5 (James J. Gross ed., 2007) (“[E]motions not only make us feel 
something, they make us feel like doing something.”); see also Eric A. Posner, 
Law and the Emotions, 89 GEO. L.J. 1977, 1979–84 (2001) (describing the role 
of emotions and how they produce action tendencies). 
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make workers more likely to discriminate,26 sexually harass oth-
ers,27 and engage in unethical practices as a way to “right” their 
perceived wrongs.28 The most direct way that Organizational 
Justice advances nondiscrimination goals is through changing 
the workplace climate, which can help prevent both discrimina-
tion and harassment. Additionally, when policies are structured 
to be just, they have the potential to excise the subjective (and 
often discriminatory) components of decision-making.29 Instead 
of centering on individuals—the focus of most failing antidis-
crimination efforts—Organizational Justice targets the organi-
zation. Enhancing justice in the workplace can also help prevent 
retributive motives from taking shape and manifesting as dis-
crimination.30 Moreover, increasing justice perceptions can  
 
 26. Niels van de Ven et al., Leveling Up and Down: The Experiences of Be-
nign and Malicious Envy, 9 EMOTION 419, 426 (2009) (discussing how un-
checked envy, when it arises in an unjust environment, can drive discrimination 
or harassment against others); Robert P. Vecchio, It’s Not Easy Being Green: 
Jealousy and Envy in the Workplace, 13 RES. PERSONNEL HUM. RESOURCES 
MGMT. 201, 205–06 (1995) (same).  
 27. There is empirical evidence showing men who feel treated unfairly by a 
supervisor at work are more likely to sexually harass other employees. Fran-
ciska Krings & Stéphanie Facchin, Organizational Justice and Men’s Likelihood 
To Sexually Harass: The Moderating Role of Sexism and Personality, 94 J. AP-
PLIED PSYCHOL. 501, 507 (2009) (demonstrating perceptions of organizational 
injustice increased sexual harassment); see Anne M. O’Leary-Kelly et al., Sexual 
Harassment as Aggressive Behavior: An Actor-Based Perspective, 25 ACAD. 
MGMT. REV. 372, 375–77, 384–85 (2000) (observing perceived injustices may 
lead one to sexually harass as a means of pursuing retributive justice); see also 
SABOTAGE IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE: ANECDOTES OF DISSATISFACTION, 
MISCHIEF, AND REVENGE (Martin Sprouse ed., 1992) (chronicling the way in 
which emotions such as envy can lead to harassment). 
 28. Shai Davidai & Thomas Gilovich, The Headwinds/Tailwinds Asym-
metry: An Availability Bias in Assessments of Barriers and Blessings, 111 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 835, 837 (2016) (observing that feeling injustice 
at work can cause people to “cut corners” or “engage in ethically questionable 
practices” to obtain the benefits obstructed by obstacles); Julia J. Lee & Fran-
cesca Gino, Envy and Interpersonal Corruption, in ENVY AT WORK AND IN OR-
GANIZATIONS 347, 353 (Richard H. Smith et al. eds., 2017) (noting envy can help 
“rationalize one’s unethical actions toward others”); Christopher M. Sterling et 
al., The Two Faces of Envy: Studying Benign and Malicious Envy in the Work-
place, in ENVY AT WORK, supra, at 57, 73 (observing that malicious envy may 
cause people to “morally disengage”). 
 29. Infra notes 201–06 and accompanying text. 
 30. Infra Parts II.B–C (discussing studies); see also Zinta S. Byrne & Rus-
sell Cropanzano, The History of Organizational Justice: The Founders Speak, in 
2 JUSTICE IN THE WORKPLACE: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 3, 3–22 (Russell Cro-
panzano ed., 2001) (discussing the evolution of organizational justice theories). 
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catalyze internal reports of harassment, which can further deter 
discrimination.31  
Organizational Justice offers the benefit, over many current 
policy efforts, of being an indirect (i.e., non-identity-conscious) 
means of achieving antidiscrimination. Identity-conscious re-
forms often engender controversy and feelings of exclusion 
among majority group members, both of which can impede social 
norm change.32 Further, the kinds of policies that Organiza-
tional Justice warrants enjoy stronger empirical and scientific 
support than most Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) poli-
cies.33 Finally, as the #MeToo and #TimesUp movements have 
illustrated, justice can be a powerful framing device.34 As the 
work of both sociologists and legal scholars has shown, people 
are receptive to arguments voiced in the register of fairness.35 
The breadth of a justice frame can thus facilitate coalition build-
ing.36 By contrast, advancing antisubordination values through 
a protected class frame is a perpetual challenge: there are iden-
tity politics with which to grapple,37 and a limit to how much 
 
 31. Andrea M. Butler & Greg A. Chung-Yan, The Influence of Sexual Har-
assment Frequency and Perceptions of Organizational Justice on Victim Re-
sponses to Sexual Harassment, 20 EUR. J. WORK & ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOL. 
729, 747–50 (2011) (arguing perceptions of procedural justice predict reports of 
sexual harassment). 
 32. Dobbin & Kalev, Diversity Challenge, supra note 14, at 49–50. 
 33. By “Equal Employment Opportunity,” or the more frequently used 
EEO, I usually refer to the policies, practices, or offices that are the outgrowth 
of a cottage industry that sprung up in the 1970s to help companies avoid run-
ning afoul of antidiscrimination laws. FRANK DOBBIN, INVENTING EQUAL OP-
PORTUNITY 10–11 (2009); see also infra Part III (discussing effective forms of 
organizational justice). 
 34. Cf. Lesley Wexler et al., #MeToo, Time’s Up, and Theories of Justice, 
2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 45, 50–53 (describing the impact of the #MeToo movement).  
 35. See Eyer, supra note 9, at 1347 (discussing research on employees’ “ex-
pansive beliefs” on fairness in the workplace); infra Part I.A.2 (summarizing the 
research on meritocracy beliefs). 
 36. Eyer, supra note 9, at 1358 (arguing that extra-discrimination reme-
dies, such as just-cause legislation may “allow the building of broad coalitions 
around a single movement for change”). 
 37. See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EX-
CLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 20 (1990) (writing about “the dilemma of differ-
ence” in which “[t]he stigma of difference may be recreated both by ignoring and 
by focusing on it”); Richard T. Ford, Beyond “Difference”: A Reluctant Critique 
of Legal Identity Politics, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 38, 57 (Wendy 
Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002) (writing about the “double bind” for identity 
politics: on the one hand, wanting to have others recognize one’s identity as 
  
2020] ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE 1929 
 
support individuals will give to civil rights causes.38 Advocating 
for more just organizations with specific policy recommendations 
in tow may be precisely the broad advocacy strategy needed to 
target organizations and further antisubordination values in a 
way that is both politically and socially palatable.39 
Organizational Justice is particularly needed given the fail-
ings of antidiscrimination law. There has been a well-docu-
mented proliferation of judge-made rules and doctrines that 
work against plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases.40 
Some of these are procedural, such as heightened pleading 
standards,41 more stringent class action requirements,42 or man-
datory arbitration agreements.43 Other rules are substantive, 
such as those requiring a plaintiff to prove she is a member of 
 
unique and distinctive, but on the other hand, needing to “make valid generali-
zations about social groups” while avoiding demeaning or inaccurate stereo-
types). 
 38. See RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, THE RACE CARD: HOW BLUFFING 
ABOUT BIAS MAKES RACE RELATIONS WORSE 175–76 (2008) (analyzing the lim-
ited goodwill for civil rights causes); cf. Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protec-
tion, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 747–49 (2011) (discussing “pluralism anxiety”). 
 39. While this might sound like a version of interest convergence—whereby 
the interests of a subordinated minority must converge with majority group con-
cerns—the reality is that antidiscrimination efforts require social buy-in and 
support in order to achieve lasting social change. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, 
Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. 
L. REV. 518, 524 (1980). 
 40. Infra notes 41–45. 
 41. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557–63 (2007) (sanctioning 
new “plausibility standard” which requires plaintiffs to show that claims are 
legally viable and factually plausible); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 
(2009) (applying new plausibility standard to all types of civil claims). Empirical 
work shows dismissal rates in Title VII cases rose sharply after this tandem of 
cases was decided. EDELMAN, supra note 14, at 65–66. 
 42. ELLEN BERREY ET AL., RIGHTS ON TRIAL: HOW WORKPLACE DISCRIMI-
NATION LAW PERPETUATES INEQUALITY 37–38 (2017) (explaining how courts 
have increasingly required more factual substantiation from class action plain-
tiffs prior to certification); EDELMAN, supra note 14, at 68–70 (same). 
 43. See EDELMAN, supra note 14, at 63–65, 134 (explaining how mandatory 
arbitration agreements are regressive for would-be employment discrimination 
litigants); Joint Statement from Law Women’s Associations Regarding Manda-
tory Arbitration Agreements (Dec. 3, 2018), https://docs.google.com/document/d/ 
1nSU-Lif9AxXoKY1p8DSD_g7sn0TMXQFsvHv7uL2NlBs/edit [https://perma 
.cc/C5LY-WFEL] (“Mandatory arbitration agreements prevent employees from 
seeking justice in court and limit the enforcement of substantive employment 
rights.”)  
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the protected class44 or those allowing the judge to disregard ev-
idence of bias.45 For the two percent of plaintiffs who ultimately 
overcome these hurdles and prevail at trial, the wins are rela-
tively modest46—and nearly half of those wins are later reversed 
on appeal.47  
Although Organizational Justice is an established and ro-
bust area of research,48 it has played only a minor role in legal 
scholarship.49 Only a handful of legal articles have enlisted its 
principles, and typically for limited purposes.50 Even within the 
social sciences there has been very little effort to examine the 
 
 44. See Jessica Clarke, Protected Class Gatekeeping, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 101, 
119–40 (2017) (exploring systematically the ways in which judges require that 
employment discrimination plaintiffs prove their membership in a protected 
class).  
 45. See generally SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 11 (chronicling the vari-
ous judge-made rules and doctrines, such as the same-actor inference or stray 
remarks doctrine, that are used to disregard evidence of bias). These rules and 
doctrines are discussed in greater depth in the “Dispositive Motions” section 
below. Infra Part I.B.2. 
 46. BERREY ET AL., supra note 42, at 13, 63 (discussing damages caps); see 
also infra note 164 and accompanying text (discussing monetary caps for indi-
vidual lawsuits). 
 47. Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination 
Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 
131 (2009) (observing, in a study that spanned seventeen years, that employee 
trial wins were reversed more than forty percent of the time on appeal, where 
only about nine percent of employer wins were reversed). 
 48. See, e.g., ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 21; JUSTICE IN THE 
WORKPLACE, supra note 30; OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE IN THE WORK-
PLACE, supra note 19. 
 49. For example, a search in Westlaw’s “Law Reviews & Journals” database 
conducted on December 18, 2018 for “ATLEAST10(“organizational justice”)” re-
turns only nine law review articles, five of which concern organizational justice 
in the context of criminal law. 
 50. See, e.g., Rachel Arnow-Richman, Public Law and Private Process: To-
ward an Incentivized Organizational Justice Model of Equal Employment Qual-
ity for Caregivers, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 25, 27 (enlisting organizational justice to 
argue in favor of “due process rights designed to enhance worker voice and pro-
vide incentives for voluntary employer accommodation of caregiving”); Lisa 
Blomgren Bingham, Designing Justice: Legal Institutions and Other Systems for 
Managing Conflict, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 37–40 (2008) (observing 
that organizational justice is the primary frame through which dispute system 
designs are evaluated, but arguing it is insufficient in that it does not address 
“the actual, objective outcome”); John Hasnas, Ethics and the Problem of White 
Collar Crime, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 579, 632–37 (2005) (positing organizational jus-
tice as one value that may conflict with a business person’s other legal and eth-
ical obligations). 
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relationship between Organizational Justice and workplace dis-
crimination51 or harassment.52 As such, this Article’s chief con-
tribution is to systematically consider how Organizational Jus-
tice might function as a tool of antidiscrimination.  
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I of this Article 
takes stock of the latest social science and legal research to pro-
vide a sweeping account of how employment discrimination law 
and policy is failing victims. Considering the cumulative barriers 
to securing legal recourse provides a unique vantage point for 
understanding the uphill climb for would-be discrimination 
plaintiffs. Part II systematically builds the case for Organiza-
tional Justice as a tool of antidiscrimination, exploring the rela-
tionship both in theory and in practice. There, I show how Or-
ganizational Justice has the potential to decrease discrimination 
and sexual harassment, moderate the effects of discrimination, 
and increase internal reporting. Part III then theorizes the hall-
mark values of policies that further Organizational Justice as 
well as identifies specific approaches that can help advance fair-
ness within the workplace. It also collects and criticizes the ar-
guments against “new governance” approaches, in which organ-
izations voluntarily self-govern in lieu of top-down regulation. 
I.  THE FAILURE OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
LAW AND POLICY   
For decades, scholars have lamented the legal difficulties 
faced by employment discrimination plaintiffs.53 New research 
 
 51. Stephen Wood et al., Discrimination and Well-Being in Organizations: 
Testing the Differential Power and Organizational Justice Theories of Workplace 
Aggression, 115 J. BUS. ETHICS 617, 618 (2013) (noting the literature has gen-
erally failed to consider how justice perceptions mediate workplace discrimina-
tion). 
 52. See Cristina Rubino et al., And Justice for All: How Organizational Jus-
tice Climate Deters Sexual Harassment, 71 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 519, 520 
(2018) (observing that most social science studies on sexual harassment have 
“focus[ed] on gender-related antecedents and fail[ed] to explore more general 
organizational factors”). While the research within the social sciences drawing 
a line between organizational justice and discrimination is nascent, it is com-
pelling. 
 53. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Anti-
discrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 43 (2006) (noting that the law is unlikely 
to sanction discrimination that stems from implicit biases); Linda Hamilton 
Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrim-
ination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1164 (1995) 
(arguing Title VII is inadequate to address unconscious forms of bias); Susan 
Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 
  
1932 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [104:1921 
 
indicates, however, that the long odds faced by such plaintiffs 
are even longer than previously thought.54 Here, I bring together 
findings from a variety of disciplines to provide a sweeping ac-
count of how, at each stage, the law’s capacity to deter discrimi-
nation or give adequate recompense is thwarted. This Part pro-
ceeds chronologically, from the initial stage of rights 
mobilization all the way to a fully litigated outcome. Most legal 
scholarship is understandably focused on, at most, one or two of 
the barriers outlined here.55 Moreover, legal scholars have de-
voted relatively little attention to the psychological impediments 
to claiming antidiscrimination rights.56 But considering the cu-
mulative psychological and doctrinal barriers to securing legal 
recourse in one place provides a unique perspective on the chal-
lenges for victims of employment discrimination. 
 
101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 460 (2001) (noting discriminatory behavior often re-
sults from “cognitive or unconscious bias, rather than deliberate, intentional 
exclusion”); Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Pal-
ace Mirage, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 911, 993–95 (2005) (noting that even though 
disparate impact liability is the most promising way of dealing with subtler 
forms of bias, such litigation is more costly (primarily because of expert testi-
mony) and expressly allows a defendant to justify any disparities). See generally 
SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 11 (discussing the varied flaws in employment 
discrimination doctrine). 
 54. See generally BERREY ET AL., supra note 42. 
 55. See, e.g., Jessica A. Clarke, Explicit Bias, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 505, 523–
47 (2018) (noting that “many courts have categorically excused, erased, or ig-
nored evidence of biased remarks rather than considering their relevance on a 
case-by-case basis”); Rosalie Berger Levinson, Parsing the Meaning of “Adverse 
Employment Action” in Title VII Disparate Treatment, Sexual Harassment, and 
Retaliation Claims: What Should Be Actionable Wrongdoing?, 56 OKLA. L. REV. 
623, 637 (2003) (“Neither the statutory language of Title VII nor current Su-
preme Court precedent justifies the onerous burden that lower courts are im-
posing on employees who are subjected to discriminatory or retaliatory treat-
ment.”); Victor D. Quintanilla & Cheryl R. Kaiser, The Same-Actor Inference of 
Nondiscrimination: Moral Credentialing and the Psychological and Legal Li-
censing of Bias, 104 CAL. L. REV. 1, 7 (2016) (“By providing employers with a 
virtually irrebuttable defense to changes of discrimination in this context, the 
same-actor doctrine converts this moral credential into a legal privilege to en-
gage in bias, thus licensing workplace discrimination.”). But see SPERINO & 
THOMAS, supra note 11 (offering a more sweeping account in their book-length 
treatment). 
 56. The most thorough exploration by a legal scholar to date is Katie Eyer’s 
article That’s Not Discrimination. Eyer, supra note 9. 
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A. PEOPLE DON’T FILE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS 
Traditionally, legal scholars have focused their efforts on the 
procedure and doctrine of law, even though rights mobilization—
which is more sociological than legal in nature—is arguably the 
most important stage for discrimination recourse. After all, if 
people fail to see an act at work as illegal discrimination (or they 
see it but will not file a claim), the most doctrinally aggressive 
laws in the world cannot help. While it appears that employees 
have become more willing to assert claims of sexual harassment 
in the current social environment,57 most workers are still gen-
erally resistant to advancing claims of discrimination.58 In fact, 
 
 57. See, e.g., Associated Press, Kevin Spacey Apologizes After Joliet Native 
Anthony Rapp Accuses Him of Sexual Advance, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 30, 2017), 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/entertainment/ct-anthony-rapp-kevin-spacey 
-sexual-advance-20171029-story.html [https://perma.cc/F6K6-TQDR]; Brooks 
Barnes & Cara Buckley, From Time’s Up to Inclusion Riders: Women Take 
Charge at the Oscars, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/03/05/movies/women-oscars-me-too.html [https://perma.cc/B755-XAFR]; 
Joe Coscarelli, R. Kelly Faces a #MeToo Reckoning as Time’s Up Backs a Protest, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/01/arts/music/r 
-kelly-timesup-metoo-muterkelly.html [https://perma.cc/JQC9-LFES]; Sheryl 
Gay Stolberg et al., Al Franken To Resign from Senate Amid Harassment Alle-
gations, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/07/us/ 
politics/al-franken-senate-sexual-harassment.html [https://perma.cc/V85M 
-QZFK]; Will Graves, Gymnast McKayla Maroney Alleges Sexual Abuse by Team 
Doctor, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.chicagotribune.com/sports/ 
breaking/ct-mckayla-maroney-larry-nassar-metoo-20171018-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/WF5J-FJTE]; Jodi Kantor & Megan Twohey, Harvey Wein-
stein Paid Off Sexual Harassment Accusers for Decades, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/us/harvey-weinstein-harassment 
-allegations.html [https://perma.cc/LWH7-RRY2]; Stephanie McCrummen et 
al., Woman Says Roy Moore Initiated Sexual Encounter When She Was 14, He 
Was 32, WASH. POST (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
investigations/woman-says-roy-moore-initiated-sexual-encounter-when-she 
-was-14-he-was-32/2017/11/09/1f495878-c293-11e7-afe9-4f60b5a6c4a0_story 
.html [https://perma.cc/5NFZ-REZY]; Stephanie Zacharek et al., Person of the 
Year 2017: The Silence Breakers, TIME (Dec. 6, 2017), https://time.com/time 
-person-of-the-year-2017-silence-breakers/ [https://perma.cc/4958-JRKH]. 
 58. See infra Parts I.A.3–4. The evidence that relates to actual charges filed 
is mixed. There is some evidence that rates of federal antidiscrimination law-
suits are declining. For example, over a 12-month period ending in March of 
2003, nearly 21,000 civil rights employment cases were filed. SPERINO & 
THOMAS, supra note 11, at 143. That number declined to 12,665 over the same 
period in 2013. Id. It is hard to know exactly what to make of this. Charge sta-
tistics from the EEOC over a 20-year period have remained fairly steady. See 
Charge Statistics (Charges Filed with EEOC), FY 1997 Through FY 2017, U.S. 
EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/ 
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one recent study estimated that 1 in 100 possible African Amer-
ican grievants files a charge with the EEOC and just 13 in 10,000 
file a federal lawsuit.59 This Section argues that potential plain-
tiffs do not file claims for four reasons: (1) their disbelief of dis-
crimination; (2) their belief in meritocracy values; (3) their fear 
of retaliation; and/or (4) their fear of poor outcomes.  
1. Disbelief of Discrimination 
People are unlikely to believe that discrimination is the cul-
prit for any particular outcome at work. In particular, most peo-
ple have a narrow mental paradigm of what constitutes discrim-
ination.60 As we confront ambiguous situations in life, we assess 
these situations through a type of mental shortcut: by comparing 
these new situations with existing mental templates of potential 
explanations.61 For example, if someone is denied a job promo-
tion and the reason for the denial is not straightforward, the per-
son could hypothesize that the reason was discrimination, merit, 
nepotism, or a personality clash. In order to settle on a reason, 
that person would likely compare the facts of the situation to ex-
isting prototypes of discrimination, merit, nepotism, or person-
ality conflicts. “The process of making judgments thus becomes 
one of comparing salient features of an existing template and the 
situation currently demanding interpretation, and judging the 
extent of similarity.”62 Templates vary from person to person, of 
course, but most people’s templates of discrimination are quite 
narrow, requiring strong evidence of invidious intent and clear 
harm before they will attribute a result to discrimination.63 
Thus, outside of exceptional circumstances, people are unlikely 
to identify discrimination as the cause of a workplace outcome. 
Another reason that people disbelieve discrimination as the 
cause for any particular outcome at work pertains to the high 
visibility of EEO policies found in the modern workplace. Such 
 
enforcement/charges.cfm [https://perma.cc/T7HP-M5WC]. So, the decrease in 
lawsuits filed could indicate that people are experiencing less reasonably ac-
tionable discrimination (unlikely), that people are simply less willing to pursue 
justice through the courts (more likely), or something else with an administra-
tive explanation. 
 59. BERREY ET AL., supra note 42, at 264.  
 60. See generally Eyer, supra note 9. 
 61. Id. at 1312–13. 
 62. Id. at 1312. 
 63. Id. at 1330. 
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policies have the potential to signal that the employer is gener-
ally nondiscriminatory. Employment policies such as affirmative 
action, antiharassment policies, or diversity training have pro-
liferated over the last fifty years and are now ubiquitous.64 These 
policies have been termed “structurally symbolic civil rights.”65 
Such policies symbolize an organization’s good-faith efforts to 
avoid discrimination and comply with statutory mandates—re-
gardless of whether such policies are actually effective in helping 
racial minorities or women achieve good outcomes at work. 
These policies can thus inadvertently keep people from exercis-
ing their rights by causing some employees to see an organiza-
tion as affirmatively nondiscriminatory, even when the facts 
don’t bear that out.66 This perception, in turn, weakens the like-
lihood that employees will take formal action to redress per-
ceived violations of antidiscrimination laws.67 These structures 
also lower the possibility that plaintiffs’ lawyers will take on a 
particular lawsuit because judges and juries are less likely to 
find that discrimination occurred when such structures are pre-
sent.68 
2. Belief in Merit 
Connected to people’s tendency to disbelieve narratives of 
discrimination is the fact that, when tasked with analyzing em-
ployment decisions, people tend to believe explanations that em-
phasize talent over other possible explanations. There is evi-
dence that “the overwhelming majority of Americans” subscribe 
to meritocracy beliefs, which makes them more likely to under-
stand discrimination as aberrational.69 Two very thoughtful 
books published since 2014 take aim at a pure notion of talent or 
 
 64. The reasons for this proliferation are beyond the scope of this Article, 
but are comprehensively explored in DOBBIN, supra note 33. 
 65. EDELMAN, supra note 1441, at 216 (arguing that “we live not in a post-
civil rights society but rather in a symbolic civil rights society”). 
 66. See, e.g., id. at 157 (detailing a series of experiments that, taken cumu-
latively, “show that the presence of symbolic structures in organizations causes 
most people to view organizations as fair, irrespective of actual injustices, ine-
qualities, and discrimination”); Anna-Maria Marshall, Idle Rights: Employees’ 
Rights Consciousness and the Construction of Sexual Harassment Policies, 39 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 83, 84 (2005) (examining rights at work in a grievance pro-
cedure and concluding that “women complain about only the most serious or 
most troubling forms of sexual conduct”). 
 67. EDELMAN, supra note 14, at 161.  
 68. Id. at 38; accord BERREY ET AL., supra note 42, at 264.  
 69. Eyer, supra note 9, at 1304. 
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merit: Joseph Fishkin’s Bottlenecks and Robert Frank’s Success 
and Luck.70 While it is tempting to view outcomes as part nature, 
part nurture, Fishkin believes that all behavioral outcomes are 
100 percent nature and 100 percent nurture.71 Neither is a suf-
ficient causal mechanism; neither does any work by itself.72 
Fishkin seeks a more pluralistic model of opportunities, in part 
because of his philosophical orientation that there is “no such 
thing as ‘natural’ talent or effort, unmediated by the opportuni-
ties the world has afforded us, which include our circumstances 
of birth.”73 Similarly, Frank notes that it is both one’s genes and 
one’s environment that determine how smart one is, which in 
turn informs whether one is likely “to perform well at the tasks 
rewarded most lavishly by society.”74 But the factor that bears 
most on workplace success is who one’s parents happen to be—a 
fact for which no one can rightly take credit.75 There are a host 
of specific advantages (or disadvantages) that parents pass along 
to their children, and in the end, this is a fundamental constraint 
on equal opportunity.76 Indeed, the correlation between parents’ 
income and their children’s later income is approximately the 
same as the correlation for height.77 A robust critique of merit—
 
 70. JOSEPH FISHKIN, BOTTLENECKS: A NEW THEORY OF EQUAL OPPOR-
TUNITY (2014); ROBERT H. FRANK, SUCCESS AND LUCK: GOOD FORTUNE AND THE 
MYTH OF MERITOCRACY (2016). 
 71. FISHKIN, supra note 70, at 95. 
 72. Fishkin offers an illustration: The conventional understanding of na-
ture/nurture is that each contributes to the person separately, in the way that 
two people, say Billy and Suzy, might partly fill a bucket with water. One might 
ask about Billy and Suzy’s contributions to the bucket of water and the answer 
might be that Billy is 60% responsible, while Sally provided 40% of the water. 
Fishkin says natural and environmental forces are, rightly understood, much 
more synergistic and offers a revised picture: Suzy brings the hose and Billy 
turns on the water. Now, the question of how much of the filled bucket is due to 
Billy and Suzy, respectively, makes little sense. The bucket of water is due 100% 
to both of their unique and complementary contributions. Id. at 95–96. 
 73. Id. at 83. 
 74. FRANK, supra note 70, at 8. 
 75. Id. (“[I]f you want to be smart and highly energetic, the most important 
single step you could take is to choose the right parents. But if you have such 
qualities, on what theory would it make sense for you to claim moral credit for 
them? You didn’t choose your parents, nor did you have much control over the 
environment in which you were raised. You were just lucky.”). 
 76. FISHKIN, supra note 70, at 48–56 (discussing incisively “the problem of 
the family” as it relates to equal opportunity). 
 77. FRANK, supra note 70, at 8 (citing economist Alan Krueger). 
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which is developed by both Fishkin and Frank, and has been pre-
viously advanced by esteemed philosophers such as Ronald 
Dworkin—seems like it would cause many to moderate their be-
liefs about deservingness.78 Meritocracy beliefs persist, however, 
and there are at least three reasons why.  
The first reason is perhaps the most obvious: people over-
play effort and downplay chance because it makes them look 
more impressive. The academic explanation for this phenome-
non is that people seek to manage their image in such a way that 
others will attribute their successes to internal traits, such as 
talent or perseverance, and attribute their failures to external 
factors, such as sickness or death in the family.79 For example, 
someone running a race would likely prefer that an impressive 
time be attributed to her ability or grit; conversely, if she does 
not run the race well, she might say the course was particularly 
difficult. People who are the most successful are thus psycholog-
ically primed to rationalize their success as the inevitable by-
product of hard work.80 Even when no one else is watching, it is 
more internally palatable to credit successes to one’s own indus-
triousness rather than to chalk them up to fate or foul play. 
The second reason is slightly less obvious, but centers on the 
notion that merit and results often have a high degree of corre-
lation. Those at the high end of the economic food chain are al-
most invariably driven and talented.81 This strong correlation 
can cause people to believe that talent alone drives success.82 
The people who are in the news for having succeeded are usually 
 
 78. Dworkin argues that it is unjust for people to have less means when it 
is due to “brute bad luck.” RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY 
AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 347 (2000). He further claims “[i]t is bad luck to be 
born into a relatively poor family or a family that is selfish.” Id. Luck, according 
to Dworkin, includes “what might be thought to be matters of identity as well 
as accidents that happen once identity is fixed, and the situation and properties 
of one’s parents or relatives are as much a matter of luck, in that sense, as one’s 
own physical powers.” Id. He enlists these characterizations in part to argue in 
favor of a “system of tax and welfare provision” based on a counterfactualized 
insurance market, in which people could theoretically purchase insurance to 
preemptively hedge against the risk of inequality of resources. Ronald Dworkin, 
Sovereign Virtue Revisited, 113 ETHICS 106, 107–09 (2002). 
 79. Edward R. Hirt et al., Self-Reported Versus Behavioral Self-Handicap-
ping: Empirical Evidence for a Theoretical Distinction, 61 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 981, 981 (1991). 
 80. FRANK, supra note 70, at xiv. 
 81. Id. at 67. 
 82. Id. at 66–68. 
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gifted and ambitious. CEOs are unusually shrewd, famous ac-
tors are exceptional thespians, professional athletes are able to 
accomplish amazing feats with their bodies, and so on. In short, 
many people harbor meritocracy beliefs because much of what 
they see in the media or in their own personal lives is meritoc-
racy-confirming. What is less visible, however, is the role of 
luck—as embodied in the families to which people were born or 
the geographic location in which they grew up. Thus, the enor-
mous number of driven and talented people who were not lucky 
enough—by way of genes or environment—to find success re-
main hidden from public view and largely unconsidered.83 
A third reason that people subscribe to meritocracy beliefs 
is hidden in plain sight: because sustaining these beliefs is fun-
damentally adaptive. There is robust evidence that downplaying 
luck through a belief that only talent and effort matter leads to 
better outcomes.84 For example, in one study, students were 
much more likely to persist with difficult academic tasks if they 
harbored strong meritocracy beliefs.85 If one’s worldview of suc-
cess centers on talent and effort, then one may naturally be mo-
tivated to work hard, which in turn makes success more likely. 
In this way, people might be strict adherents to meritocracy be-
liefs in part because it is instrumentally useful, which also 
makes it more likely that such beliefs will survive and pass to 
the next generation.86 
3. Fear of Retaliation 
Fear of retaliation is perhaps the most obvious reason that 
people choose not to file discrimination claims, and such fears 
are justified. One study found that two-thirds of employees who 
 
 83. See id. at 151–57 (showing through simulations the way in which luck 
plays a critical role in whether talented people achieve material success). 
 84. Id. at 69–78. 
 85. See Bernard Weiner, Attribution Theory, Achievement Motivation, and 
the Educational Process, in ACHIEVEMENT MOTIVATION AND ATTRIBUTION THE-
ORY 185 (Bernard Weiner, ed. 1974) (showing that internal attributions, such 
as ability or effort, rather than external ones, such as luck, suits one better for 
future successes). 
 86. FRANK, supra note 70, at 73–77 (observing a Darwinian flare to meri-
tocracy beliefs by acknowledging that “[p]arents who teach their children that 
luck doesn’t matter may for that very reason be more likely to raise successful 
children than parents who tell their children the truth”). 
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spoke up against workplace mistreatment faced some form of re-
taliation.87 As a result, every antidiscrimination law features  
antiretaliation provisions, which are intended to ensure that em-
ployees cannot be fired for lodging a complaint.  
Even though legal protection for retaliation is built into an-
tidiscrimination laws, it is far from adequate. Specifically, those 
who complain internally are not protected from retaliation un-
less they can show their belief of illegality was objectively rea-
sonable.88 While it may sound sensible to require that grievants 
limit their complaints to conduct which is reasonably understood 
as illegal, the law of employment discrimination often does not 
track with lay understandings of discrimination or harass-
ment.89  
The fear of retaliation, coupled with the complexity of dis-
crimination law, can erode the adequacy of legal protections. If 
an employee complains too early, the conduct may not yet be se-
vere enough to be objectively illegal; but if they complain too late, 
it may vitiate their legal claim either by falling outside of the 
limitations period or by allowing the employer to invoke the af-
firmative defense that the employee failed to utilize its internal 
investigation process.90 Doctrines such as the same-actor infer- 
 
 87. See Lilia M. Cortina & Vicki J. Magley, Raising Voice, Risking Retalia-
tion: Events Following Interpersonal Mistreatment in the Workplace, 8 J. OCCU-
PATIONAL HEALTH PSYCHOL. 247, 255 (2003) (noting that only 34% did not ex-
perience retaliation in response to speaking up against sexual harassment or 
incivility). 
 88. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271 (2001); see Deborah 
L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 83 (2005) (“Since Breeden, courts 
have required plaintiffs bringing retaliation claims under the opposition clause 
to demonstrate a good faith, reasonable belief that the underlying conduct 
amounted to unlawful discrimination.”). 
 89. Studies have shown that employees frequently overestimate the em-
ployment protections afforded to them by law. Alex B. Long, Retaliation Back-
lash, 93 WASH. L. REV. 715, 730 (2018) (citing Rachel Arnow-Richman, Main-
streaming Employment Contract Law: The Common Law Case for Reasonable 
Notice of Termination, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1513, 1558 & n.236 (2014)). 
 90. The Supreme Court established a two-part affirmative defense by 
which employers may insulate themselves from liability for harassment that 
does not result in a tangible employment action. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 
524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indust., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
Under the first part of the defense, an employer must prove it “exercised rea-
sonable care to prevent and correct promptly any harassing behavior.” Ellerth, 
524 U.S. at 765. An employer will typically meet this requirement by having in 
place an “effective internal investigation process that” is set up to address com-
plaints of harassment. Alex B. Long, The Troublemaker’s Friend: Retaliation 
Against Third Parties and the Right of Association in the Workplace, 59 FLA. L. 
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ence,91 stray remarks doctrine,92 and adverse action doctrine93 
further increase the likelihood that an employee could mistak-
enly believe certain conduct violates the law.  
But even if plaintiffs were fully versed in the law and the 
law was more protective than it is, fear of retaliation would likely 
remain a significant consideration for employees. Many employ-
ers would still retaliate and, just like with the issue of discrimi-
nation, the goal is to prevent retaliation—not only give proper 
recourse. Moreover, there are many forms of low-level retalia-
tion, e.g., managers or other co-workers are no longer friendly 
toward you, that are not actionable,94 but matter quite a bit to 
most people. 
4. Fear of Poor Outcomes 
One final reason people do not report discrimination is that 
they decide the costs of doing so exceed the benefits. One prime 
benefit is a material recovery from the employer. But the odds of 
“winning” discrimination claims are bleak.95 Many fail to ex-
haust their administrative remedies, which in the context of an 
employment discrimination claim means filing a complaint with 
the EEOC or an equivalent state agency within the requisite 
time period, giving the agency sufficient notice of the claim and 
 
REV. 931, 952 (2007). To satisfy the second part of the defense, an employer 
must show that the employee “unreasonably failed to take advantage of any 
preventative or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid 
harm otherwise.” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. 
 91. Under this inference, courts resist allegations of discrimination if the 
alleged discriminator is the same person who made the original hiring decision. 
See Quintanilla & Kaiser, supra note 55 (discussing same-actor inference in ar-
ticle-length treatment); see infra note 147 and accompanying text. 
 92. Under this doctrine, courts exclude words or statements that could be 
used to show bias if they are unrelated to the employment decision, too remote 
in time, or too ambiguous. See Clarke, supra note 55 (discussing stray remarks 
doctrine in article-length treatment); infra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 93. Under this doctrine, actions are often not considered serious enough to 
be actionable as discrimination. Actions that are often not considered serious 
enough include giving an employee negative evaluation, assigning additional 
work, or even threatening to fire a worker. See infra note 149 and accompanying 
text. 
 94. See infra note 149 and accompanying text (explaining the adverse ac-
tion doctrine, under which courts often judge retaliatory actions that fall short 
of termination as not serious enough to be actionable under employment dis-
crimination law). 
 95. See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text. 
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time to investigate, and ultimately receiving a “right to sue” let-
ter.96 Unless all of these requirements are met, a plaintiff does 
not have standing in court.97 Additionally, the odds of finding an 
attorney to take an employment discrimination case are long.98 
One result is that about one-fifth of all such plaintiffs proceed 
pro se, which impairs the chances of success.99 Even assuming 
one finds an attorney willing to take the case, the old model of 
going to trial against the company and prevailing in a way that 
puts the pinch on a big corporation is outdated. Just six percent 
of employment discrimination cases make it to trial, and only in 
one-third of those cases does the plaintiff prevail.100 In the two 
percent of filings in which a plaintiff ultimately succeeds at trial, 
the award is “typically about $150,000.”101 
A rational person will also assess the costs of bringing a dis-
crimination claim. The costs are far more certain than any ben-
efits and come in many forms. Chief among the costs is the pos-
sibility of social backlash. The psychological literature shows 
that coworkers tend to denigrate those who complain of discrim-
ination, even when there is evidence that the claim is true.102 
 
 96. Filing a Charge of Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY 
COMM’N https://eeoc.gov/employees/charge.cfm [https://perma.cc/4T6W-A78U]. 
 97. Id. 
 98. BERREY ET AL., supra note 42, at 264 (“Our interviews with plaintiffs’ 
attorneys reveal that they take only about one in ten cases for which they are 
approached.”). 
 99. Id. at 68 (observing one in five plaintiffs litigates pro se). 
 100. Id. at 61 fig.3.4. The 6% is actually a fairly rosy finding. In one of the 
most comprehensive studies of employment discrimination suits (all federal 
cases from fiscal year 1970 to 2001), the authors found a steady decline in em-
ployment discrimination claims reaching trial, culminating in 3.7% for 2001. 
Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination 
Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 438 (2004). 
Another study from the Southern District of New York over four years (1997–
2001) showed an employment discrimination trial rate of 3.8%, with a plaintiff 
win rate at trial of 33.6%. See Michael Delikat & Morris M. Kleiner, An Empir-
ical Study of Dispute Resolution Mechanisms: Where Do Plaintiffs Better Vindi-
cate Their Rights?, 58 DISP. RESOL. J., 56, 56–57 (2003). A more recent study, 
focused only on the District of Maryland between 2007 and 2008, found employ-
ment discrimination plaintiffs reached trial in less than 2% of cases. Charles A. 
Brown, Note, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in the District of Maryland, 
96 CORNELL L. REV. 1247, 1259 tbl.1 (2011) (showing bench trials at 0.73% and 
jury trials at 1.17% of all outcomes). 
 101. BERREY ET AL., supra note 42, at 264. 
 102. Cheryl R. Kaiser & Carol T. Miller, Derogating the Victim: The Inter-
personal Consequences of Blaming Events on Discrimination, 6 GROUP PRO-
CESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 227, 234–36 (2003). Reporting discrimination may 
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Workers who sue are also often vilified by their employers and 
sometimes badmouthed more widely within the industry.103 A 
multi-decade, qualitative study of discrimination plaintiffs 
found that litigation imposes a “high personal cost,” with many 
of the litigants experiencing one or more of the following as by-
products of their lawsuit: joblessness, depression, alcoholism, or 
divorce.104 
Finally, even if employees do eventually decide to file a 
claim, it may be too late. Employment discrimination laws have 
“internal limits” that require claims to be filed with the EEOC 
or a similar state agency within 180 or 300 days105—a short 
deadline when compared to the limitation periods for tort or con-
tract claims.106 Similarly, once the EEOC has worked through 
the charge and issued a “right to sue” letter, the plaintiff has 
only 90 days from then to file in court.107 Any employee will nat-
urally require time to mull the potential consequences of filing a 
legal claim, but by the time they have considered all of them, the 
limitations period may have run. Employees may also be reluc-
tant to bring claims while still employed, for fear of poisoning 
the well or encountering interpersonal hostility. But after being 
terminated, it is usually too late to go back and complain about 
earlier years of problematic decisions and treatment.108 
 
also put one’s coworkers in the position of having to give information or testi-
mony they may not want to give. 
 103. BERREY ET AL., supra note 42, at 19, 265. 
 104. Id. at 266. They open their book with the example of a “successful” em-
ployment discrimination litigant. This plaintiff sued his employer for racial har-
assment, settled his claim for $50,000, and even won back his job. Statistically 
speaking, he “won.” But he also suffered many harms. Tensions from the law-
suit led to a divorce; he felt cheated by the settlement; he paid 20% of the set-
tlement to his lawyer; his ex-wife claimed half of the remaining payment; and 
finally, though he regained his job, he lost seniority, which may have played a 
role in his layoff one year later due to downsizing. Id. at 3–5. 
 105. The general requirement is to file a charge within 180 calendar days 
from the date of discrimination, but the deadline is extended to 300 days “if a 
state or local agency enforces a law that prohibits employment discrimination 
on the same basis.” Time Limits for Filing a Charge, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPOR-
TUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/employees/timeliness.cfm [https://perma 
.cc/8SBJ-9FJ5]. 
 106. SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 11, at 10–12. 
 107. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2018). 
 108. The exception to this is hostile work environment and pay discrimina-
tion claims. In the former, the idea is that a hostile work environment can build 
over years and so it is appropriate to consider all of the acts that constitute a 
full-grown hostile workplace. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 
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B. PEOPLE DON’T “WIN” EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS 
Employment discrimination plaintiffs are derailed by the 
law at every stage of litigation. Procedurally, many plaintiffs are 
forced to arbitrate their claims—a phenomenon that disad-
vantages employment discrimination plaintiffs. Additionally, 
the barriers for class actions have risen to the point that only one 
percent of filings are certified, chilling the prospects for those 
with claims that only make sense in aggregated form.109 Among 
cases filed in court, about one-third are disposed of by motion, 
but virtually all of these successful motions are ones filed by the 
employer.110 In the few cases that actually reach trial, plaintiffs 
rarely win and the odds of that decision being reversed on appeal 
are nearly a coin flip.111 Finally, most cases settle for small 
amounts and silence victims through nondisclosure agree-
ments.112 While this section on legal barriers will be com-
pressed—in part due to the volume of prior coverage and in part 
due to constraints of length113—it will provide a survey of these 
impediments. 
1. Mandatory Arbitration and Class Relief 
Procedurally, there are several different ways that plaintiffs 
are derailed from pursuing litigation. One such way is found in 
the law surrounding class actions. Class actions have long been 
understood as indispensable for antidiscrimination: class actions 
generate publicity and can better deter future discrimination;114 
 
101, 115 (2002). Regarding the latter, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 
modified the law to say that the discriminatory act renews itself with each new 
inequitable paycheck. Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5.  
 109. BERREY ET AL., supra note 42, at 264. 
 110. Id. at 60–65. 
 111. Supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text. Another comprehensive 
study found that plaintiffs win at trial between 20 and 40% of the time upon 
reaching trial—depending upon whether the trial is in front of a judge (19.29%) 
or jury (37.77%). Clermont & Schwab, supra note 100, at 457 app. (analyzing 
employment discrimination outcomes over a period of time between 1979 and 
2000). 
 112. BERREY ET AL., supra note 42, at 19. 
 113. Entire books have been devoted to the limits and nuances of employ-
ment discrimination procedure and substantive doctrine, including two excel-
lent ones published just last year. See, e.g., JOSEPH A SEINER, THE SUPREME 
COURT’S NEW WORKPLACE: PROCEDURAL RULINGS AND SUBSTANTIVE WORKER 
RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES (2017); SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 11. Ex-
ploring all of these nuances is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 114. SEINER, supra note 113, at 59. 
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discriminatory people or policies often harm more than just one 
employee in the organization;115 and the damages are often low 
enough that aggregation is necessary to incentivize lawyers to 
bring such suits.116 Indeed, the advisory notes on Rule 23(b)(2) 
specifically mention civil rights lawsuits as ones where class ac-
tion status may be particularly appropriate.117 Even so, it has 
become substantially harder to bring (and win) class action 
cases. Courts have increasingly applied more stringent interpre-
tations of the commonality requirement,118 as well as required 
more in the way of merits before certifying the class.119 These 
changes culminated in Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, where the Su-
preme Court declined to certify a class in an employment dis-
crimination case in which the female plaintiffs alleged they were 
paid unequally, disproportionately excluded from management, 
and frequently encountered bias.120 Nevertheless, the Court con-
cluded that the discriminatory actions of local managers across 
the country were not enough to establish a company-wide “pat-
tern and practice” of discrimination.121 In light of the fact that 
the Court would not allow this meticulously-litigated case out of 
the starting gate, plaintiffs’ lawyers are far less apt to bring such 
lawsuits in the future.122 
Another procedural impediment is found in mandatory ar-
bitration agreements (MAAs). Mandatory arbitration has long 
been derided by scholars as a way in which employers tilt the 
odds further in their favor.123 Nevertheless, MAAs are more pop-
ular than ever, with an estimated sixty million workers being 
subject to such agreements.124 Companies like Google, Star- 
 
 115. Id. at 13. 
 116. Id. at 59 (noting class actions are critical for those with “smaller mone-
tary claims, who might not otherwise have been able to obtain representation” 
to access their statutory rights); id. at 158. 
 117. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee’s note to 1966 amend. 
 118. BERREY ET AL., supra note 42, at 37. 
 119. EDELMAN, supra note 41, at 69. 
 120. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011). 
 121. Id. at 69. 
 122. SEINER, supra note 113, at 64. 
 123. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It 
Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1649–50 (2005) (recognizing that MAAs allow em-
ployers to utilize a variety of methods to gain an advantage over employees).  
 124. Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Growing Use of Mandatory Arbitration: Ac-
cess to the Courts Is Now Barred for More than 60 Million American Workers, 
ECON. POLICY INST. (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.epi.org/files/pdf/135056.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6MWT-8R6K]. 
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bucks, and Uber all require workers to sign MAAs.125 The prob-
lems with mandatory arbitration are varied, but can be distilled 
into three essential concerns: (1) it unfairly favors employers, 
(2) it is opaque and nonreviewable, and (3) it further erodes class 
actions. 
First, employers are systematically favored by arbitration. 
While employees rarely “win” in litigation and recover only mod-
est amounts when they do,126 employees win even less frequently 
and in smaller amounts when arbitrating.127 This is in part be-
cause employers, as “repeat players,” can choose arbitrators that 
have been known to rule in favor of other employers.128 Arbitra-
tors likewise have a built-in incentive “to favor employers, who 
unlike employees, are in a position to hire the arbitrator again 
in the future.”129 Thus employers begin arbitration with a thumb 
on the scale. 
Second, arbitration is a private form of resolution that is un-
accountable to the public. This opacity implicates substantive 
justice, as even if an arbitrator’s decision is decided incorrectly 
as a matter of law, it is nearly impossible to appeal the outcome 
under federal law.130 Furthermore, arbitrators are more likely to 
conserve rather than expand the law, a tendency that owes 
 
 125. Alexia Fernandez Campbell & Alvin Chang, There’s a Good Chance 
You’ve Waived the Right To Sue Your Boss, VOX (Sep. 7, 2018), https://www.vox 
.com/2018/8/1/16992362/sexual-harassment-mandatory-arbitration [https:// 
perma.cc/TB3G-WQP6]. 
 126. Supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text. 
 127. Zev. J. Eigen & David Sherwyn, Deferring for Justice: How Administra-
tive Agencies Can Solve the Employment Dispute Quagmire by Endorsing an 
Improved Arbitration System, 26 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 217, 259 (2016); 
David Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, Employment Arbitration After 
the Revolution, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 457, 478–79 (2016) (analyzing arbitration 
win rates through statistics); Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Arbitration Sty-
mies Progress Towards Justice in Employment Law: Where to, #MeToo?, 54 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 155, 185 (2019). 
 128. See, e.g., Alexander J.S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Ar-
bitration: Case Outcomes and Processes, 8 J. EMP. LEGAL STUD. 1, 15 (2011) 
(finding a strong “repeat-employer-arbitrator pairing effect” and concluding we 
ought to be concerned about possible “arbitrator bias” or an employer’s ability 
to select more pro-employer arbitrators). 
 129. Kate Webber Nuñez, Toxic Cultures Require a Stronger Cure: The Les-
sons of Fox News for Reforming Sexual Harassment Law, 122 PENN ST. L. REV. 
463, 507–08 (2018). 
 130. David Seligman, The National Consumer Law Center’s Model State 
Consumer and Employee Justice Enforcement Act: Protecting Consumers, Em-
ployees, and States from the Harms of Forced Arbitration Through State-Level 
Reforms, 19 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 58, 59 (2016). 
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partly to the need to appease employers who can rehire the arbi-
trator in the future.131 This inherent secrecy starkly disad-
vantages employees. 
Third, the Supreme Court’s 2018 ruling in Epic Systems 
Corp. v. Lewis, which allows companies to require workers to ac-
cept individual arbitration, further undermines the possibility 
of class relief.132 The most recent evidence shows that nearly half 
of employees covered by arbitration clauses have waived their 
right to be part of a class action.133 As a result, employees must 
proceed individually through the arbitration process, further in-
creasing the likelihood that their claims will fail to spur systemic 
change within the organization. All three of these concerns have 
coalesced in the recent very public criticism of MAAs, which has 
spanned from law students at elite schools protesting against 
law firms134 to victims of sexual harassment protesting the una-
vailability of a judicial forum.135 
2. Dispositive Motions 
Another reason plaintiffs don’t “win” discrimination claims 
lies in the increasing use of dispositive motions. Judges have 
adopted a host of rules and doctrines that they use to dismiss 
employment discrimination cases. Among federal employment 
discrimination cases, approximately thirty-seven percent are re-
solved by dispositive motions.136 Among those cases that achieve 
a fully litigated outcome, i.e., those that are not settled, eighty-
six percent are dismissed via motion.137 Further, the result in 
dismissals is almost completely one-sided, with recent studies 
 
 131. Sternlight, supra note 127, at 186–93 (arguing that employment arbi-
trators are less likely to issue progressive decisions than courts). 
 132. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619 (2018) (stating arbitra-
tion agreements with class and collective waivers are enforceable under the 
FAA). 
 133. Colvin, supra note 128, at 2. 
 134. See, e.g., Alexia Fernandez Campbell, Female Law Students Pressure 
Firms To Stop Banning Sexual Harassment Suits, VOX (Dec. 3, 2018), https:// 
www.vox.com/2018/12/3/18123798/womens-student-association-mandatory 
-arbitration [https://perma.cc/PE49-4RZE]. 
 135. Nuñez, supra note 129, at 467. 
 136. BERREY ET AL., supra note 42, at 60–65 (basing its conclusion on com-
bining the dismissal rates for several procedures yielding involuntary disposal 
without a trial). 
 137. Of the author’s quantitative dataset of 1672 cases, 833 were settled at 
some stage in the litigation. Of the 710 remaining cases that reached a fully 
litigated outcome, 610 (or 86%) of those were dismissed. Id. at 68.  
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finding that three-quarters of summary judgment motions are 
resolved in favor of the employer.138 
For motions to dismiss, the Twombly and Iqbal cases—de-
cided by the Supreme Court in 2007 and 2009, respectively—
have starkly increased dismissal rates in antidiscrimination 
suits.139 Historically, courts employed a generous standard and 
only dismissed complaints if it was “beyond doubt” the plaintiff 
could prove “no set of facts” that would establish liability.140 But 
Twombly and Iqbal, taken together, require plaintiffs’ pleadings 
in all civil claims to be “facially plausible” in order to survive a 
motion to dismiss.141 This new standard might generally seem 
reasonable, but factual development is particularly difficult in 
employment discrimination cases where the touchstone is often 
intent—something that is nearly impossible to establish without 
access, often through discovery, to the employer’s personnel and 
policies.142 Heightened pleading standards thus result in a catch-
22: the plaintiff ’s claim cannot survive to the discovery phase 
without having sufficient facts, but the plaintiff cannot obtain 
sufficient facts without discovery. The plausibility standard has 
been a devastating phenomenon for employment discrimination 
 
 138. Sperino and Thomas cite two studies, one from 2007 and one from 2013, 
which found that employers consistently win on summary judgment in discrim-
ination cases. SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 11, at 23. Specifically, one study 
found employers winning such motions 83% of the time and the other around 
70%. Id. 
 139. Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal 
Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 608–09 (2010). Studies of Twombly 
and Iqbal (Twiqbal) have been legion, but also criticized for their indeterminacy. 
See David Freeman Engstrom, The Twiqbal Puzzle and Empirical Study of Civil 
Procedure, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1203 (2013) (noting the proliferation of empirical 
studies of limited determinative value following the Twombly and Iqbal deci-
sions). 
 140. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957). 
 141. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 678, 681 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 546–47 (2007). 
 142. SEINER, supra note 113, at 30. Consider hiring discrimination cases, 
where applicants frequently fail to hear back from the employer or are rejected 
with little accompanying information. It might be impossibly difficult for such 
a plaintiff to allege “plausible” hiring discrimination. Id. Seiner contrasts this 
inside information problem with tort claims, for example, where typical plain-
tiffs “would have the same access to photos, police investigation reports, and 
insurance information.” Id. at 31. 
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plaintiffs, increasing the rates at which motions to dismiss are 
granted in Title VII cases from forty-two to fifty-three percent.143  
For summary judgment motions, there are two trends—one 
general and one specific—that undercut employment discrimi-
nation suits. The general tendency has been the increased grant-
ing of motions for summary judgment (MSJs) in resolving dis-
putes. Courts were at one point cautious about such motions. But 
then in a trio of cases referred to as the “Celotex trilogy,” the 
Court flipped the conventional wisdom on MSJs. In particular, 
the Celotex Court ruled that the party moving for summary judg-
ment need not offer evidence to negate the other side’s claim, but 
can instead simply point to the absence of evidence offered by 
the other side.144 The Court also explicitly endorsed the use of 
MSJs, noting their utility in securing “the just, speedy and inex-
pensive determination of every action.”145 The result has been an 
uptick in cases resolved by summary judgment in almost every 
subject matter area, but especially employment discrimination 
cases.146 
The specific trend undercutting employment discrimination 
suits has been the proliferation of rules and doctrines—most 
heavily criticized—that all work in favor of employers. In partic-
ular, these doctrines allow judges to minimize, or disregard alto-
gether, possible evidence of employment bias. Three key rules 
are: (1) the same-actor inference, under which courts resist alle-
gations of discrimination if the alleged discriminator is the same 
person who made the original hiring decision;147 (2) the stray re-
marks doctrine, under which words or statements that could be 
 
 143. Hatamyar, supra note 139, at 608–09; see SEINER, supra note 113, at 
25 (calling Twombly and Iqbal “the two most devastating cases for employment 
plaintiffs in the last decade”). 
 144. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). 
 145. Id. at 327 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 1).  
 146. Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation 
Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court 
and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1048–53 (2003) (citing 
studies that show courts granted summary judgment more often after the Ce-
lotex trilogy and noting the effect has been pronounced in the areas of “civil 
rights” and “age discrimination,” among others). 
 147. Amirmokri v. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 60 F.3d 1126, 1130 (4th Cir. 1995) 
(determining the company’s failure to promote the plaintiff was not due to bias 
on basis of national origin—even though the worker was harassed on account of 
his Iranian descent almost daily—since the people who made the decision to 
hire him were the ones who later made the decision not to promote him). 
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used to show bias are excluded if they are unrelated to the em-
ployment decision, too remote in time, or too ambiguous;148 and 
(3) the adverse action doctrine, under which actions such as giv-
ing a negative evaluation, assigning additional work, or even 
threatening to fire a worker are not considered serious enough 
to be actionable as discrimination.149 As a complement to these 
bias-minimizing rules, courts typically exclude evidence of dis-
crimination experienced by other employees, sometimes called 
“me-too” evidence, on the theory that it is more prejudicial than 
probative.150 The tenor of these doctrines is that antidiscrimina-
tion laws do not make it illegal to treat employees unfairly. But 
such laws do proscribe treating an employee unfairly because of 
a protected trait.151 Accordingly, Title VII expressly requires 
that courts second-guess unfairness of a certain kind when it 
manifests in personnel decisions.152 Nevertheless, courts fre-
quently invoke the sentiment that they do not sit as a “super-
personnel department” to second-guess the employer’s deci-
sions—even when the employer’s actions could be interpreted as 
pretextual in nature.153  
While any one of these bias-minimizing rules or inferences 
might be justified within the confines of a particular case, taken 
 
 148. E.g., Sweezer v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr. No. 99-1644, 2000 WL 1175644, at 
*5 (6th Cir. Aug. 11, 2000) (determining that even though plaintiff was called 
“nigger” and “bitch,” supervisor’s “comments were brief and isolated, and are 
more indicative of a personality conflict than of racial animus”). 
 149. E.g., Myers v. Maryland Auto. Ins. Fund, No. CCB-09-3391, 2010 WL 
3120070, at *5 (D. Md. Aug. 9, 2010) (finding that even though termination was 
threatened, there was no “tangible detrimental effect to the terms or conditions 
of his employment”); see also Sandra F. Sperino, Retaliation and the Reasonable 
Person, 67 FLA. L. REV. 2031, 2036 (2015) (showing that courts construe the 
adverse action requirement narrowly and routinely dismiss cases in which 
workers allege, e.g., that employers subjected them to negative evaluations, dis-
ciplinary write-ups, shift changes, and removal from an office). 
 150. GREEN, supra note 13, at 105; see, e.g., Jones v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., 
823 F. Supp. 2d 699, 734 (S.D. Ohio 2011) (“‘Me too’ evidence is typically inad-
missible under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence because it prejudices 
the defendant by embellishing the plaintiff ’s own evidence of alleged discrimi-
nation and typically confusing the issue of whether the plaintiff, and not others, 
was discriminated against.”). 
 151. SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 11, at 78. 
 152. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e-5(g) (2018). 
 153. SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 11, at 78–83 (surveying the various 
ways in which the phrase “super-personnel department” is used to believe the 
employer’s stated reason, even when the evidence suggests the reason is untrue, 
the employer did not follow its posted qualifications, or the employer did not 
follow its own policies). 
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together they often make it prohibitively difficult for plaintiffs to 
prevail. Specifically, judges use these doctrines to “slice and dice” 
specific pieces of evidence from the case.154 This evidentiary side-
lining of biased statements or pretext-implying decisions can 
transform a plaintiff ’s colorable case into a legal nonstarter. En-
tire articles and book chapters have been devoted to these bias-
minimizing doctrines,155 so I merely flag them here. The critical 
point is that, cumulatively, these doctrines as well as others like 
them have amalgamated into a major barrier for employment 
discrimination plaintiffs seeking justice in the courts.  
3. Settlements, Trials, and Appeals 
The final reason employment discrimination plaintiffs do 
not “win” their claims is discovered through analyzing what ac-
tually constitutes a “win.” Leading up to trial, the majority of 
cases are settled and the best evidence to date indicates the me-
dian settlement is around $30,000.156 Even if one is lucky enough 
to settle for more—the seventy-fifth percentile settlement is 
closer to six figures157—the result may still be unfulfilling. The 
attorney will take a cut, the company will likely not make any 
major structural changes, and the claimant will almost surely be 
forced to sign a confidentiality agreement promising not to say 
anything that would besmirch the company’s reputation.158 In 
short, the material benefits of litigating or negotiating a discrim-
ination claim are routinely trifling. 
If the claim is not settled and actually proceeds to trial, em-
ployment discrimination plaintiffs face yet another obstacle: 
proving the causal relationship between a protected trait and an 
adverse employment decision. Proving causation is difficult in 
any context,159 but discrimination cases present unique chal-
lenges. Cause as a concept is derived largely from the law of 
torts, which is frequently geared toward understanding the 
 
 154. See generally Michael J. Zimmer, Slicing & Dicing of Individual Dis-
parate Treatment Law, 61 LA. L. REV. 577 (2001) (illustrating this phenomenon 
through examination of cases). 
 155. Supra note 55. 
 156. BERREY ET AL., supra note 42, at 63. 
 157. Id. (noting a 75th percentile settlement value of $92,458). 
 158. Id. at 1–10 (providing several illustrative anecdotes).  
 159. For example, on the one end of causation is the butterfly effect and on 
the other side is sole causation, but either could be reasonably understood as 
causal in nature. SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 11, at 102. 
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physical causes of physical events.160 Nevertheless, “but for” cau-
sation is frequently invoked within the corpus of antidiscrimina-
tion law: it is the legal causation standard for retaliation and age 
discrimination claims, and it is frequently invoked in disparate 
treatment cases.161 Causation presents challenges for antidis-
crimination law since the event of discrimination is often imper-
ceptible. It is one thing to unpack cause and effect for a dented 
bumper or broken leg. It is quite another to recognize the cause 
for why one person out of eight applicants was not hired or pro-
moted. Employment discrimination cases are thus challenging 
to prove in large part because they revolve around nonphysical 
and nonconcrete states of mind.162  
As noted earlier, the odds of reaching trial and succeeding 
are low,163 and the chances of succeeding at trial are further 
stunted by the built-in limits of damage caps. The 1991 Civil 
Rights Act capped compensatory and punitive damages for all 
employers; the liability for the largest employers (500+ employ-
ees) is capped at $300,000 while the smallest covered employers 
(15–100 employees) are capped at $50,000.164 These limited fi-
nancial judgments curtail the ability of laws like Title VII or the 
Americans with Disabilities Act to deter discrimination. When 
 
 160. Id. at 107. There are of course torts that do not fit this mold, such as the 
intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
 161. In disparate treatment cases, a plaintiff can prevail by showing either 
that the protected trait was the “but for” (or sole) cause of the adverse employ-
ment action (a “single motive” claim, which allows one to recover economic dam-
ages) or that the trait merely “motivated” the action (a mixed motive claim, 
which does not allow one to recover economic damages). See Civil Rights Act of 
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 703, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2018)) (indicating a plaintiff may prevail by showing a 
trait was a “motivating factor” for any employment decision, but also creating 
an affirmative defense where the employer can show it would have made the 
same decision “in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor”). 
 162. SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 11, at 107. 
 163. See supra notes 95–101 and accompanying text. 
 164. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (applying caps only to damages for “future pe-
cuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss 
of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses and the amount of punitive 
damages”). The caps do not apply to back pay or front pay. Pollard v. E.I. du 
Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 848–49 (2001). These caps have not been 
adjusted since the Civil Rights Act was passed, and the caps are fixed—no mat-
ter how egregious the conduct. SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 11, at 13. Fi-
nally, the caps do not apply to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA), under which compensatory and punitive damages are not available, 
but liquidated damages are (in effect, a doubling of back pay and front pay). 
SEINER, supra note 113, at 11–13. 
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employers do not have to worry about multimillion-dollar ver-
dicts, discrimination may become part of the normal cost of doing 
business.165 
When cases are mishandled at trial, there is of course the 
promise of righting the result through appeal. But an appeal pre-
sents no guarantee—just another bite at the apple. In fact, the 
appellate process disproportionately favors employers. One 
study found that when employers appeal a jury verdict for the 
plaintiff, the appellate court reverses those wins forty-two per-
cent of the time.166 In contrast, when the worker appeals a jury’s 
defense verdict, the appellate court reverses the employer’s win 
only seven percent of the time.167 Further, appealing a case is 
expensive and, as with trials, it will likely take years to complete 
the appeal. Those facts both cut in favor of employers, who usu-
ally have deeper pockets and a greater tolerance for delay. 
II.  ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE AS 
ANTIDISCRIMINATION   
The concept of justice has consumed theorists for millennia. 
Aristotle argued that justice requires rewards and punishments 
be distributed according to “merit.”168 John Rawls averred that 
justice is “the first virtue of social institutions.”169 Legal theo-
rists also write incessantly about various formulations of justice. 
Sometimes the focus is on the treatment of people within a legal 
system, e.g., “juvenile justice” or “access to justice.”170 Other 
times the focus is on the rationale for how a law is structured, 
e.g., “corrective justice” or “distributive justice.”171 Accordingly, 
 
 165. See Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination: The Nature of Class 
Action Employment Discrimination Litigation and Its Effects, 81 TEX. L. REV. 
1249, 1301, 1322–23 (2003) (arguing the damage caps place such a low price on 
discrimination that businesses might naturally treat it as a “controllable cost of 
doing business”). 
 166. Kevin M. Clermont et al., How Employment-Discrimination Plaintiffs 
Fare in Federal Courts of Appeals, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 547, 552 (2003). 
 167. Id. 
 168. THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE, bk. V, ch. III (R.W. Browne 
trans., H.G. Bohn 1853) (c. 384 B.C.E.). 
 169. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3 (1971). 
 170. E.g., Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 
22 STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1970); Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1785 (2001). 
 171. E.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality 
of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949, 988–95 (1988) (discussing these iterations of justice). 
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discussing justice in a coherent way often requires focus on a 
specific domain, such as the court system or workplace. 
Despite all of its philosophical trappings, justice is quite a 
pragmatic lens through which to view the workplace. Nearly eve-
ryone has at some point felt that a work situation was unfair; 
indeed, the workplace naturally foments feelings of injustice in 
several ways. First, the fact that employers typically distribute 
finite goods and compensation based upon some notion of merit 
means that some workers will necessarily enjoy more goods than 
others; inequality is built in. Second, any distribution of out-
comes in the workplace typically happens according to some set 
of rules and standards and employees are likely to form judg-
ments about the fairness of these criteria. Third, most work-
places are socially dynamic organizations, requiring people to in-
teract. The quality of these interactions can stir up thoughts that 
a particular person has acted in ways that are biased or unjust. 
Organizational Justice, as a field of study, is thus a natural ex-
tension of the way in which the workplace produces feelings ori-
ented around whether compensation, policies, and people are 
just. 
As noted in the Introduction, Organizational Justice is gen-
erally thought to sub-divide into three sets of work-related con-
cerns: (1) what people receive (distributive justice); (2) the 
standards, rules, and processes under which people receive (pro-
cedural justice); and (3) how people are treated along the way 
(interactional justice).172 While all three subdivisions are valua-
ble, this Article focuses on general perceptions of justice. There 
has been a recent shift toward focusing on “overall justice cli-
mate perceptions”—a generalized measure of distributive, pro-
cedural, and interactional justice.173 There is compelling evi-
dence that overall justice perceptions are what drive behavior 
within organizations, more so than any one specific sub-dimen-
sions.174  
Of course, there is no way to document the precise level of 
justice in any particular organization. One might productively 
think about Organizational Justice through the metaphor of oil 
 
 172. Id. Interactional justice is often further divided into interpersonal jus-
tice, which concerns the treatment of employees by supervisors or managers, 
and informational justice—a concern characterized by the “quality of infor-
mation employees obtain from communications with their supervisor or manag-
ers.” Cho & Sai, supra note 22.  
 173. Rubino et al., supra note 52, at 523. 
 174. Id. 
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for the workplace’s smooth operation. When the emotional heat 
is low, the gears of the workplace are well-lubricated and em-
ployees can work comfortably and productively toward a shared 
mission.175 But when people’s feelings turn up the emotional 
heat in the workplace, individuals can readily ignite and engage 
in workplace aggression, such as invidious discrimination or har-
assment.176 Importantly, workers’ perceptions of justice may 
“fully mediate the effects of changes in the workplace on aggres-
sion.”177 In other words, when people view the workplace as prin-
cipally fair, they are far less likely to lash out when policies 
change or they otherwise face negative outcomes at work. 
Many observers have, quite naturally, deduced that the con-
nection between justice and discrimination is that discrimina-
tion is unjust. Indeed, some scholars have made this connection 
explicit: that fairness or justice is the touchstone of antidiscrim-
ination law.178 This Part will explore the relationship from the 
other vantage point, which is perhaps less straightforward: how 
the relative amount of justice in an organization might either 
prevent or contribute to discrimination. Specifically, my claim is 
that Organizational Justice has a previously-unexplored role to 
play, both in fending off harassment and discrimination, and in 
fostering the willingness of workers to internally report such be-
haviors. 
A. ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE CAN PREVENT DISCRIMINATION 
Legal scholarship typically does not examine why people dis-
criminate or harass others.179 Even most social science scholar-
ship overlooks why people choose to discriminate, by focusing on 
victims in lieu of perpetrators.180 Yet when people differentiate 
 
 175. Cho & Sai, supra note 22, at 245 (discussing Organizational Justice as 
a “lubricant” for smoothing out employee development programs in the work-
place). 
 176. I.M. Jawahar, A Model of Organizational Justice and Workplace Ag-
gression, 28 J. MGMT. 811, 814 (2002). 
 177. Id. at 814. 
 178. Jessica L. Roberts, Protecting Privacy To Prevent Discrimination, 56 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 2097, 2116 (2015). 
 179. That said, scholars have gradually and increasingly built a persuasive 
case for considering the general relationship between emotions and the law. 
See, for example, Susan Bandes’s early, seminal book tying emotions to law. 
THE PASSIONS OF LAW (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999) (chronicling the place of 
emotions in the law through a series of essays on different legal subjects). 
 180. E.g., Krings & Facchin, supra note 27, at 501 (“Most research [on sexual 
harassment] has focused on prevalence, on targets’ reactions and perceptions, 
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between persons, they surely do so for a reason—a fact that an-
tidiscrimination doctrine expressly acknowledges.181 Two con-
ventional explanations for why people discriminate is stereotyp-
ing and in-group preference,182 but there is a third, more 
recently-discovered reason: acute injustice. 
Employees are more likely to experience feelings such as in-
justice, anger, or envy when they perceive that a policy or course 
of action is fundamentally unjust.183 These feelings serve as “ac-
tion tendencies,” prompting certain employees to act unethically 
or to discriminate against others.184 Moreover, even when per-
ceived injustices do not result in workers enacting full-blown dis-
crimination, there are a variety of less severe ways that per-
ceived injustices may cause employees to interfere with the 
opportunities of others. Such actions may include gossip, favor-
itism, or sabotaging others’ work efforts.185 Discrimination may 
thus be understood, in some instances, as an act of aggression in 
response to perceived injustices.186  
 
and on prevention. Little is known about why and when actors engage in har-
assing behavior.”). Of course, the paucity of research on people who discriminate 
is in part due to the research difficulties in obtaining adequate samples of actual 
discriminators. Id. 
 181. Courts presume that people do not act in an arbitrary manner. So, if 
discrimination is alleged, and the employer cannot provide a legitimate reason 
for the adverse employment action, courts will generally assume the employer 
based its decision on an impermissible consideration. See, e.g., Furnco Const. 
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (“[W]e know from our experience that 
more often than not people do not act in a totally arbitrary manner, without any 
underlying reasons, especially in a business setting. Thus, when all legitimate 
reasons for rejecting an applicant have been eliminated as possible reasons for 
the employer’s actions, it is more likely than not the employer, who we generally 
assume acts only with some reason, based his decision on an impermissible con-
sideration such as race.”). 
 182. Alexandra Kalev et al., Best Practices or Best Guesses? Assessing the 
Efficacy of Corporate Affirmative Action and Diversity Policies, 71 AM. SOC. REV. 
589, 593 (2006). 
 183. Russell Cropanzano et al., Entity Justice and Entity Injustice: A Review 
and Conceptual Extension, in JUSTICE IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 30, at 
224 (citing studies); Davidai & Gilovich, supra note 28, at 837 (noting felt injus-
tices can produce envy); Christine A. Henle & Megan Naude, An Eye for an Eye: 
Counterproductive Work Behavior as an Emotional Reaction to Injustice in the 
Workplace, in ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 21, at 140, 145 (citing stud-
ies). 
 184. Supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text. 
 185. See generally SABOTAGE IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE, supra note 27. 
 186. Wood et al., supra note 51, at 618. 
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In fact, when an employee perceives multiple forms of injus-
tice, or if the inequity is felt to be particularly severe, the re-
sponse may sometimes culminate in one person choosing to ver-
bally or physically harass another person.187 Imagine that an 
employee feels he was unjustly denied a critical promotion. So-
cial science research shows that an employee who perceives such 
an injustice may then attempt to punish the decision-maker or 
the person who actually received the promotion via sexual or ra-
cial harassment.188 Or, this employee might choose to harass 
other people by directing his frustration or aggression toward 
someone else in the organization who is less able to impose job-
related costs upon him.189 Researchers refer to this phenomenon 
as “displacement,” because the injustice-induced aggression is 
displaced onto a convenient, and often safer, target.190 
This Article is not suggesting that most people discriminate 
or harass others because they face unfairness in the workplace. 
Even so, compelling new evidence indicates that an organiza-
tionally just climate can serve as a strong deterrent to—and pre-
dictor of—discrimination and harassment.191 Specifically, an or-
ganizational focus on fairness through polices and rewards can 
cause all employees to feel respected, establish expectations for 
how employees should treat coworkers, and foster the value of 
 
 187. Jawahar, supra note 176, at 819. 
 188. Krings & Facchin, supra note 27, at 507 (demonstrating perceptions of 
organizational injustice increased sexual harassment); see O’Leary-Kelly et al., 
supra note 27, at 375–77, 384 (observing perceived injustices may lead one to 
sexually harass as a means of pursuing retributive justice); see also SABOTAGE 
IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE, supra note 27, at 24–35 (chronicling the way in 
which emotions such as envy can lead one to harass others); Niels van de Ven 
et al., supra note 26, at 426 (discussing how unchecked envy, when it arises in 
an unjust environment, can drive discrimination or harassment against others); 
Vecchio, supra note 26, at 205 (same). 
 189. O’Leary-Kelly et al., supra note 27, at 376. 
 190. Id. (observing the employee who feels unfairly treated might displace 
their harassment onto “those who are perceived as similar to the individual who 
caused the goal frustration but are less powerful socially”); see also MELINDA 
JONES, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE 132 (2002) (“History is replete with 
examples of political figures in times of economic contraction affixing economic 
blame onto minority groups.”). 
 191. E.g., id. at 524, 539–40 (finding support for “collective justice climate as 
an independent predictor of harassment and a moderator of the effectives of 
objectively measured sex similarity and harassment climate on sexual harass-
ment”). 
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evenhanded treatment among workers.192 Fair managerial prac-
tices cause workers to feel “valued, respected, and integrated 
within the work domain.”193 When workplaces and their constit-
uent policies are just, employees are less likely to lash out to-
ward coworkers or the organization.194 Thus, hewing to the nor-
mative values of Organizational Justice, discussed further 
below,195 has the potential to increase equality of opportunity by 
depressing the negative emotions and the negative actions that 
most affect marginalized groups and individuals.196 
Even when injustice is not perpetrated by another person, 
such as when employees feel that a policy or rule is unfair, the 
felt inequity can still increase discrimination. For example, im-
agine that the employee who was denied the promotion feels that 
an organization’s promotion criteria are biased and fundamen-
tally unfair. The employee might seek retribution against other 
people—more concrete scapegoats—rather than the organiza-
tion.197 This approach is part of a subordinating, historical pat-
tern in which individuals may direct aggression for distressing 
events toward vulnerable third parties who bear no responsibil-
ity.198 
Organizational Justice can also decrease discrimination by 
advancing nondiscrimination as a guiding workplace value. 
Where decisions are not consistently based upon accurate, job-
related information, it becomes more likely that decisions will 
turn instead on group-based heuristics—something legal schol-
ars have termed “statistical discrimination.”199 That is, when 
 
 192. Id. at 520, 524. 
 193. Rubino et al., supra note 52, at 526. 
 194. Supra notes 175–77 and accompanying text. 
 195. Infra Part III.A (discussing the normative values of just workplaces). 
 196. See Henle & Naude, supra note 183, at 137 (observing one form of coun-
terproductive work behavior is political deviance, in which one seeks to “disad-
vantage others personally or politically (e.g., favoritism, gossiping or blaming 
coworkers, unproductive competition)”). 
 197. Krings & Facchin, supra note 27, at 502. If the perceived unfairness is 
severe enough, he might discriminate or degrade others in an attempt to achieve 
the instrumental and expressive aims outlined above. 
 198. In one particularly stark example, researchers found that as the econ-
omy declined between 1882 and 1930 the numbers of black lynchings increased. 
JONES, supra note 190, at 132. 
 199. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in 
Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817, 842–43 (1991) (observing that 
“statistical discrimination” derives from people making “rational statistical in-
ferences about average differences among [ ]  groups”); Cass R. Sunstein, The 
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employers lack clear information, they often use group stereo-
types to sort out characteristics that are seen as costly or other-
wise undesirable, e.g., criminal convictions or bankruptcies.200  
For example, in one study, economists concluded that em-
ployers frequently discriminate against African American males 
by using race as a proxy for involvement in the criminal justice 
system.201 The authors of that study then made a startling find-
ing: employers who actually used criminal background checks 
were over fifty percent more likely to hire African Americans 
than employers who did not.202 That study illustrates that em-
ployers who are not making decisions according to set criteria or 
information are more likely to rely on group-based heuristics 
that may harm disadvantaged populations. Having data or other 
metrics in place for employment decision-making—a form of pro-
cedural justice—can help steer decision-makers away from dis-
criminatory biases or favoritism.203 For instance, the ability to 
draw on factual information about criminal backgrounds pre-
vented many employers from instead drawing discriminatory in-
ferences based on race and acting upon them.204 Lior Strahilevitz 
has argued that having access to more relevant information, and 
actually making use of it pursuant to set criteria, can keep em-
ployers from overemphasizing “readily discernible facts like race 
or gender.”205 In this way, Organizational Justice provides a 
 
Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2417 (1994) (arguing “statistical dis-
crimination” occurs when generalizations about a group are seen as “less costly 
to use than any subclassifying device”). 
 200. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Privacy Versus Antidiscrimination, 75 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 363, 365 (2008). 
 201. Harry J. Holzer et al., Perceived Criminality, Criminal Background 
Checks, and the Racial Hiring Practices of Employers, 49 J.L. & ECON. 451, 453 
(2006) (concluding that in the absence of background checks, employers use race 
“and other perceived correlates of criminal activity to assess the likelihood of an 
applicant’s previous felony convictions and factor such assessments into the hir-
ing decision”). 
 202. Strahilevitz, supra note 200, at 367 (citing Holzer et al., supra note 201, 
at 464). 
 203. Henle & Naude, supra note 183, at 137 (noting that organizational in-
justice may lead to personal aggression, sexual harassment, and favoritism); 
Paul E. Levy et al., The Role of Due Process in Performance Appraisal: A  
20-Year Retrospective, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE IN THE WORKPLACE, 
supra note 19, at 605, 605–06. 
 204. Holzer et al., supra note 201, at 464. 
 205. Strahilevitz, supra note 200, at 372 (arguing for the government to sub-
sidize “information clearinghouses” for employers that store people’s past em-
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structural framework within which all individuals—and espe-
cially those from less-privileged backgrounds—can avoid in-
stances of discrimination and, in turn, pursue their full poten-
tial.206  
B. ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE CAN MODERATE THE EFFECTS OF 
DISCRIMINATION 
There is a second way—other than preventing discrimina-
tion—that Organizational Justice may advance nondiscrimina-
tion goals: by moderating the effects of discrimination. Social 
psychologists have documented that the effect of negative treat-
ment is uneven, with more privileged groups being less af-
fected.207 For example, when women perceive discrimination, 
their psychological well-being is likely to be harmed; in contrast, 
men report that perceived discrimination has little to no effect 
on their internal wellness.208 This observation seems to illumi-
nate the resiliency of privilege—a phenomenon that Nancy Di-
Tomas poignantly describes as “an invisible knapsack” that ma-
jority group members carry around.209 This knapsack is, in her 
words, “filled with institutional social resources to use whenever 
necessary,” and it also provides “a cognitive experience of good-
will and affective preference that allows [majority group mem-
bers] to feel confident, secure, and capable as they make deci-
sions and encounter choices throughout their lives.”210 This 
metaphor helps explain why many workers who are deprived of 
fairness in the workplace, and especially those who belong to un-
derprivileged groups, can “lose their sense of belonging and ex-
istence in a given context and tend to become lonely, depressed 
 
ployee evaluations, involvement in bankruptcy or criminal justice systems, mil-
itary records, and educational credentials). Strahilevitz concludes that statisti-
cal discrimination is “often more troubling than overt discrimination on the ba-
sis of criminal or bankruptcy history.” Id. at 380. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Michael M. Harris et al., “I Think They Discriminated Against Me”: Us-
ing Prototype Theory and Organizational Justice Theory for Understanding Per-
ceived Discrimination in Selection and Promotion Situations, 12 INT’L J. SELEC-
TION & ASSESSMENT 54, 62 (2004). 
 208. Id. 
 209. NANCY DITOMASO, THE AMERICAN NON-DILEMMA: RACIAL INEQUALITY 
WITHOUT RACISM 7 (2013). 
 210. Id. (citations omitted). 
  
1960 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [104:1921 
 
and anxious and, over time, withdraw.”211 In short, discrimina-
tion has its most profound effects on the least privileged constit-
uencies, reproducing hierarchies and the privilege of the status 
quo. 
But, research shows that Organizational Justice can moder-
ate the effects of bias in the workplace. When employees see 
their workplaces as fair, they are less likely to emotionally suffer 
from discriminatory decisions—at least those decisions that stop 
short of termination.212 In other words, these employees may 
still face bias in the workplace, but they may be better emotion-
ally equipped to weather the effects. Specifically, studies show 
that when employees have strong perceptions of Organizational 
Justice, those workers are less likely to feel anxiety, depression, 
and emotional exhaustion due to discrimination.213 This effect is 
amplified when the source of discrimination is not a manager but 
is instead a coworker or a customer.214 Put another way, employ-
ees may see discrimination by a coworker or customer as less 
troubling within a just organization—which can in turn mitigate 
the emotive effects of bias, such as depression. When managers 
enact Organizational Justice principles, therefore, it can miti-
gate the effects of discrimination even when the discrimination 
cannot be prevented altogether. 
Of course, one might question whether moderating the ef-
fects of discrimination is a good thing. Some might think it best 
for victims to fully feel the exclusionary effects of discrimination, 
which in turn could make them more likely to litigate such 
claims. This argument has merit, but is misplaced for a few key 
reasons. First, and most importantly, it is not mutually exclusive 
for an organization’s culture to moderate the effects of depres-
sion and emotional exhaustion and simultaneously be a place 
 
 211. Yuka Fujimoto et al., Toward a Diversity Justice Management Model: 
Integrating Organizational Justice and Diversity Management, 9 SOC. RESP. J. 
148, 150 (2013). 
 212. In the case of termination, it stands to reason both that the employee is 
likely to think the organization has inflicted a distributional injustice upon her 
and that this perception of injustice is unlikely to be mitigated much by past 
thoughts or feelings that her former workplace was a fair one. 
 213. Wood et al., supra note 51, at 628 (“[O]rganizational justice perceptions 
are important ingredients in any explanation of the effect of discrimination on 
employees’ well-being . . . .”). 
 214. See id. at 628 (“[M]anagers’ role as custodians and inventors of organi-
zational policies may be crucial in explaining why their acts of discrimination 
are perceived as reflecting badly on the organization procedures and allocation 
of rewards . . . .”). 
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where workers feel free to raise claims of discrimination or har-
assment. As the Section below shows, Organizational Justice ac-
tually increases the likelihood that workers will report behavior 
that they perceive to be discriminatory. Second, even if Organi-
zational Justice theoretically made it less likely for employees to 
litigate their grievances, that opportunity cost currently does not 
seem very high. As previously described, the typical experience 
of employment discrimination litigants is not very empowering: 
the chances of actually reaching trial are low, the median settle-
ment is inadequate, and the litigation process exacts a great per-
sonal cost.215 I am not claiming that the calculus of whether to 
sue is generally clear one way or another, only that it is contest-
able whether more litigation will increase the well-being for mi-
nority groups. 
C. ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE CAN INCREASE REPORTING OF 
DISCRIMINATION 
When harassment occurs within an organization, it must be 
reported or an employee’s claim may later be doomed in the legal 
process.216 In the late 1980s, the Supreme Court decided two 
cases that, in certain instances,217 give employers an affirmative 
defense against sexual harassment claims when there is an in-
vestigative protocol in place to address sexual harassment and 
the employee does not take full advantage of it.218 The market 
response to these decisions included the proliferation of anti-
harassment policies, grievance procedures, and sexual harass-
ment training.219 While on the surface this spread of antidiscrim-
ination policies looks like progress, the evidence indicates that 
most such policies have not worked to deter sexual harass-
ment.220 Further, research indicates that most women who are 
 
 215. Supra notes 95–101 and accompanying text. 
 216. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington 
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
 217. Faragher/Ellerth is the affirmative defense for supervisor harassment 
only; in cases alleging coworker harassment, there is a similar, but slightly dif-
ferent standard lower courts have devised, which is part of the employee’s af-
firmative burden to prove. 
 218. In Faragher, 524 U.S. 775, and Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, the Supreme 
Court established a two-part affirmative defense by which employers may insu-
late themselves from liability for harassment that does not result in a tangible 
employment action. See supra note 90. 
 219. DOBBIN, supra note 33, at 5–8. 
 220. Rubino et al., supra note 52, at 520. Perhaps most damning of all, when 
the EEOC reviewed the empirical literature on harassment training in 2016, it 
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harassed will not label the behavior as “sexual harassment,” 
which will often prevent them from taking any action at all.221 
Of those who do label the behavior as harassment, most still will 
not report the treatment to an authority.222 In fact, somewhere 
around seventy percent of those who experience harassment do 
not talk to anyone in charge at work and a greater number still 
refuse to file a formal complaint.223 Non-reporting persists even 
though nearly every medium-to-large company has installed an-
tiharassment protocols over the last several decades.224  
One of the great challenges in addressing discrimination 
and harassment is getting people to speak up—an enduring ob-
stacle that the #MeToo era has illuminated.225 When an em-
ployee fails to report harassment, the organization does not re-
ceive notice about a person’s bad behavior, which increases the 
 
refused to say whether such training was effective in preventing harassment. 
Elizabeth C. Tippett, Adapting to the New Risk Landscape, HARV. BUS. REV. 
(Feb. 1, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/02/adapting-to-the-new-risk-landscape 
[https://perma.cc/AW4N-9UK8]; see also Dobbin & Kalev, Diversity Fail, supra 
note 14, at 60 (2016) (observing “strategies for controlling bias . . . have failed 
spectacularly since they were introduced . . . . The problem is that we can’t mo-
tivate people by forcing them to get with the program and punishing them if 
they don’t”). 
 221. Vicki J. Magley et al., Outcomes of Self-Labeling Sexual Harassment, 
84 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 390, 390 (1999). 
 222. See generally Laurie A. Rudman et al., Suffering in Silence: Procedural 
Justice Versus Gender Socialization Issues in University Sexual Harassment 
Grievance Procedures, 17 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 519, 520 (1995) (ob-
serving “most studies reveal that the majority of [sexual harassment] offenses 
remain unreported”). 
 223. See Lilia M. Cortina & Jennifer L. Berdahl, Sexual Harassment in Or-
ganizations: A Decade of Research in Review, in 1 THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF OR-
GANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 469, 485 tbl.2 (J. Barling & C.L. Cooper eds., 2008) 
(citing two studies that show only 26% and 17–36%, respectively spoke to some-
one in authority about the harassment, and citing four studies that show some-
where between 2–20% of people who suffer harassment file a formal complaint).  
  One may naturally wonder if change lies around the corner now that 
there is seemingly greater support for victims of sexual harassment. See supra 
note 57. But even with greater social empathy, there are still tremendous costs 
to reporting harassment—especially when the alleged perpetrator is a person 
in a position of power. Further, all of the reasons why people do not file discrim-
ination claims—fear of being disbelieved, fear of retaliation, and fear of poor 
outcomes—apply in the sexual harassment context as well. 
 224. DOBBIN, supra note 33, at 1–11. 
 225. See, e.g., Kimberly T. Schneider et al., Job-Related and Psychological 
Effects of Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Empirical Evidence from Two 
Organizations, 82 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 401, 406–07 (1997) (showing women 
who are sexually harassed typically do not report harassment).  
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likelihood that it will continue. In considering how to galvanize 
reports of harassment, there has recently been a cultural rally-
ing cry around the phrase “believe women.”226 But what does it 
mean to believe women, and how exactly can that be accom-
plished? In the organizational context, we could understand “be-
lieve women” to mean fostering an expectation among employees 
that their voice will be heard and also fairly and fully consid-
ered.227 But to support women’s claims in a way that is respon-
sible to all parties requires fairness in process, or what Organi-
zational Justice theorists describe as procedural justice.  
Research shows that Organizational Justice is a strong pre-
dictor for whether employees will make the decision to report 
harassment.228 Specifically, when employees believe that an or-
ganization is even-handed, they are more likely to utilize a griev-
ance procedure—in part because they believe they will be 
“heard” and in part because fairness perceptions can be an anti-
dote to the fear of retaliation.229 In fact, social science demon-
strates empirically that procedural justice concerns are more in-
fluential when it comes to whether victims file harassment 
complaints than even gender socialization issues230—a tradi-
tional explanation for why so few women report sexual harass-
ment.231 
 
 226. See generally Believe Women, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Believe_women [https://perma.cc/NUN8-QPSM]. 
 227. See Sady Doyle, Despite What You May Have Heard, “Believe Women” 
Has Never Meant “Ignore Facts,” ELLE, (Nov. 29, 2017) https://www.elle.com/ 
culture/career-politics/a13977980/me-too-movement-false-accusations-believe 
-women/ [https://perma.cc/7PG5-94HD] (observing that “believe women” means 
“don’t assume women as a gender are especially deceptive or vindictive, and 
recognize that false allegations are less common than real ones”). 
 228. See Butler & Chung-Yan, supra note 31, at 750–51 (“The current study 
also indicated that justice perceptions are especially important for predicting 
reporting and confrontation responses when women have experienced frequent 
sexual harassment.”); Rudman et al., supra note 222, at 534 (analyzing results 
of research to conclude that procedural justice concerns are a “superior explica-
tor of the reliably low reporting rate for sexual harassment”). But see Yoon Jik 
Cho, Organizational Justice and Complaints in the US Federal Workplace, 22 
INT’L REV. PUB. ADMIN. 172, 186–87 (2017) (concluding that “federal employees 
are less likely to file complaints when they perceive” that the workplace is or-
ganizationally just). 
 229. Butler & Chung-Yan, supra note 31, at 750–51; Rudman et al., supra 
note 222, at 537–38. 
 230. Rudman et al., supra note 222, at 537. 
 231. See Stephanie Riger, Gender Dilemmas in Sexual Harassment Policies 
and Procedures, 46 AM. PSYCHOL. 497 (1991) (observing that women may, due 
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It might seem counter-intuitive that perceptions of Organi-
zational Justice can inspire reporting of discrimination and har-
assment. As Lauren Edelman has documented, certain types of 
workplace policies that are oriented around nondiscrimination—
such as diversity training, affirmative action, and EEO offices—
can symbolize an employer’s good faith and chill litigation.232 
Further, if an organization is actually fair and attentive to the 
needs of its employees, it might mollify workers who would oth-
erwise raise claims.233 But two responses to these points are in 
order. First, research indicates that a truly just organizational 
climate, not merely one with certain policies in place, is what 
facilitates reporting.234 An employer cannot merely install cer-
tain policies and achieve Organizational Justice or nondiscrimi-
nation. In the next Section, I will explore the values that cause 
people to feel their organization is just. Second, the research on 
Organizational Justice is more specific than the general claim 
that EEO policies often amount to structurally symbolic civil 
rights;235 this research indicates that an organizationally just 
climate facilitates internal reporting of sexual harassment—a 
much more particular claim.236 Edelman is instead concerned 
with the general possibility of employee cooption through poli-
cies that merely symbolize, but do not effectuate, a commitment 
to antidiscrimination.237 In the final Section of Part III, I will 
directly address Edelman’s claim as it might relate to all of my 
arguments; for now, it suffices to say that Organizational Justice 
can support employees, and especially women, as they move 
through the internal processes for reporting sexual harassment. 
III.  ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE IN ACTION   
This Article has thus far been concerned with building the 
case for how Organizational Justice may further antidiscrimina-
tion values. In this Part, I outline the underlying normative val-
ues of Organizational Justice, which allow us to discern what 
types of employment policies will produce more just workplaces. 
 
to how they are socialized, emphasize caring (over justice) and nonconfrontation 
in their responses to sexual harassment). 
 232. See supra notes 64–68 and accompanying text. 
 233. Cho, supra note 228, at 186–87. 
 234. Supra notes 228–31. 
 235. EDELMAN, supra note 41, at 216. 
 236. Supra notes 228–31. 
 237. EDELMAN, supra note 41, at 11 (discussing this concern). 
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I also consider in greater detail what employers can do to ad-
vance fairness in the workplace. Finally, this Part considers sev-
eral specific counterarguments that might be raised against my 
thesis. 
A. THE NORMATIVE VALUES OF ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE 
It is tempting to try to spell out the specific policies that, if 
implemented, will increase justice in the workplace—a checklist 
of sorts.238 But to do so would risk a version of “Goodhart’s Law,” 
in which once “a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good 
measure.”239 As antidiscrimination law has already shown, once 
the installation of certain polices becomes the target, rather than 
the underlying value of antidiscrimination, many employers 
start to “game the system” or behave in ways that make the im-
plementation of those EEO policies less effective.240 The most 
helpful thing is not to gin up a “list of ready to go, discrete 
measures that can be implemented across all organizations,”241 
but rather to identify the hallmark values of Organizational Jus-
tice that transcend specific programs and provide a meta-guide 
for future legal policies. 
 
 238. The counsel of Organizational Justice may naturally invite certain 
managerial interventions, such as structuring the hiring process to be fairer 
and more transparent for applicants, giving employees a voice when it comes to 
changing workplace policies, and employing socially sensitive managers. See 
Henle & Naude, supra note 183, at 155 (advocating structural processes for em-
ployees to voice their “justice concerns”); Debra L. Shapiro & Elad N. Sherf, The 
Role of Conflict in Managing Injustice, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE IN 
THE WORKPLACE, supra note 19, at 443, 453–54 (citing studies that prove the 
role of “interpersonal sensitivity” in impacting justice perceptions); Donald M. 
Truxillo et al., Applicant Fairness Reactions to the Selection Process, in OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 19, at 621, 629–32 
(chronicling insights related to the types of selection tools that will maximize 
perceptions by applicants of fairness and validity). 
 239. Goodhart’s Law, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goodhart% 
27s_law [https://perma.cc/J8VV-7885]. 
 240. Lauren Edelman has written about the role of organizations in affecting 
nondiscrimination norms. She writes that organizations have instituted a vari-
ety of Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) structures—such as diversity 
training, affirmative action, and EEO offices—largely to “comply” with antidis-
crimination laws. EDELMAN, supra note 41, at 3–18. She laments that many 
such policies are “merely symbolic,” or ineffective. Id. at 11. Worse, they may 
actually “mask” discrimination both internally (as workers view employers as 
nondiscriminatory) and externally (as lawyers and judges view employers as 
nondiscriminatory). Id. at 5, 155–56, 171.  
 241. GREEN, supra note 13, at 136. 
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1. Transparency 
Scholars have long celebrated transparency and enlisted it 
as a guiding principle for legal and policy reform.242 One might 
see transparency’s intuitive allure as owing in part to its bond 
with U.S. democracy, specifically, that governmental transpar-
ency fosters an accessible government and informed citizens who 
can make better decisions to hold the regime accountable.243 In 
the context of the workplace, transparency is one of the most 
critical determinants of whether a system is seen as fair.244 
Transparency naturally implicates both material employment 
outcomes (distributive justice) and the way in which decisions at 
work are made (procedural justice).  
For transparency to be accomplished in the workplace, it is 
critical that employees have both notice and knowledge of the 
applicable rules or standards.245 This insight borrows from “fair-
ness heuristic theory,” under which people have a tendency to 
make fairness judgments from the information that is readily 
available to them.246 Within this vein, workers who feel that they 
understand a performance appraisal process are much more 
likely to rate the system as fair.247 Of course, for transparency to 
truly facilitate justice, employees’ understandings of how the 
rules and standards will be applied must also match up with how 
they are actually applied. 
Transparency can foster both justice itself and perceptions 
of justice. One of the best examples is found in hiring. When em-
ployers resolve to hire someone, they must make decisions 
around both advertising the job and providing criteria for the po-
sition. For current employees, the decision to advertise the job 
widely and to be detailed about specific job requirements is a 
show of transparency, which belies nepotism and encourages 
 
 242. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal 
Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 958–63 (2006) (arguing for more transparency 
in criminal procedure); Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw 
Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 533 (1999) (“It has long been a value in 
liberal constitutional regimes that regulation be transparent.”); Cynthia A. Wil-
liams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Trans-
parency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1207 (1999) (making the case for “corporate 
social transparency”).  
 243. Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 894 
(2006). 
 244. Levy et al., supra note 203, at 609–10. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Fujimoto et al., supra note 211, at 157. 
 247. Levy et al., supra note 203, at 610. 
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perceptions of fairness. Moreover, transparency in job openings 
and eligibility encourages nondiscrimination by “operat[ing] as 
a shortcut around biased information networks.”248 In contrast, 
when job criteria are less explicit, decision-makers are more 
likely to “shift job criteria to fit the qualifications of the candi-
date who best fits gendered (or racial) expectations for a job.”249  
Or consider again the study involving criminal background 
checks.250 Actually having information about applicants’ crimi-
nal backgrounds resulted in less discrimination against African 
Americans given that the factual information was more favora-
ble than the inferences employers otherwise drew.251 In other 
words, transparency in the specific area of criminal history de-
creased discrimination by cutting out the application of racial 
stereotypes. 
One notable adjunct to transparency is voice: when employ-
ees are given a chance for their voices to be heard regarding 
workplace policies, they are less likely to view the employer’s 
systems as opaque and more likely to see them as fair.252 Increas-
ing voice increases interactional justice, which is one of the most 
difficult sub-dimensions of Organizational Justice to ensure.253 
One simple and costless system for facilitating voice is to have a 
complaint or suggestion process. Even if a particular complaint 
does not lead to any change, simply allowing the complaint to be 
made increases the perception that the workplace’s policies are 
fair.254 In a similar vein, allowing employees to give input into 
 
 248. GREEN, supra note 13, at 137. 
 249. Id. at 114. Of course, this still happens with explicit criteria, where peo-
ple may emphasize or deemphasize certain criteria to favor certain groups. See 
Cynthia Estlund, Just the Facts: The Case for Workplace Transparency, 63 
STAN. L. REV. 351, 404 (2011) (showing that greater workplace transparency 
can lead to greater compliance with employment discrimination laws). 
 250. Supra notes 201–05 and accompanying text. 
 251. Id.  
 252. See Henle & Naude, supra note 183, at 155 (advocating structural pro-
cesses for employees to voice their “justice concerns”). 
 253. Specifically, it is hard to ensure through policy that managers treat peo-
ple with dignity and easier to simply implement certain policies or adjust com-
pensation. Social psychologists have observed that when employees are allowed 
to provide input or feedback, it is one of the most effective ways to increase in-
teractional justice. Juan Diego Vaamonde & Alicia Omar, Perceptions of Organ-
izational Justice and Ambivalent Sexism: The Moderating Role of Individual-
ism-Collectivism, 35 REVISTA DE PSICOLOGÍA 31, 52 (2017). 
 254. Henle & Naude, supra note 183, at 155. 
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the appraisal process increases justice perceptions—even if their 
resulting performance review is negative.255  
But transparency is not always simple. Scholars have been 
quick to critique transparency, especially where it is valorized in 
the abstract or where its unintended consequences are not fully 
appreciated.256 Consider applicants who are rejected for a job. 
On the one hand, information that is provided to applicants may 
enhance fairness perceptions and could make them less likely to 
sue;257 indeed, the strength of this effect has been shown to apply 
to applicants with both positive and negative outcomes.258 On 
the other hand, human resource professionals are almost always 
counseled not to give applicants specific reasons for the decision 
because the reason provided could intensify the feelings they 
have about being rejected.259 So, if the applicants object to the 
specific explanation, it could make them even more likely to 
sue.260 In this specific context, there are risks either way, but it 
stands to reason that providing some explanation can give the 
company greater control over the situation. In short, transpar-
ency can foster both justice and justice perceptions, even if the 
road to organizational transparency is sometimes a bumpy one. 
2. Accountability 
At the outset, it is worth noting that accountability can flow 
naturally from transparency. For example, when an employer is 
transparent about its decision-making processes or compensa-
tion structure, it can cause other employees or third parties to 
seek justice. In one field study, a firm had a discriminatory rec-
ord of giving black workers smaller raises than white workers 
 
 255. Shapiro & Sherf, supra note 238, at 453. 
 256. See Fenster, supra note 243, at 885 (arguing that open government laws 
have failed to achieve transparency in part because in “relying on the assump-
tions of ‘transparency,’ they typically operate at exceptionally high levels of ab-
straction”); David E. Pozen, Transparency’s Ideological Drift, 128 YALE L.J. 100 
(2018) (illustrating, through historical examples, how transparency has no set 
political valence). 
 257. Truxillo et al., supra note 238, at 632 (citing various studies for this 
proposition). 
 258. Id. 
 259. E.g., Paula Ancona, Part of Hiring Is Telling Others They Didn’t Get 
Job, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 31, 1991, at 5. 
 260. Providing explanations to unsuccessful candidates would run afoul of 
the conventional advice for human resource professionals. E.g., id. (“Don’t feel 
obligated to give specific reasons for not choosing an applicant.”). 
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with equal performance scores.261 The researcher then had the 
firm post each unit’s average performance rating and average 
pay raise by race and gender.262 Once decision-makers knew that 
internal constituencies were watching, the pay gap nearly disap-
peared overnight;263 transparency mediated by accountability 
produced a more just result.  
In this Section I am focused on something slightly different: 
how creating formal structures of accountability endogenous to 
the workplace can produce just outcomes. Social psychologists 
have focused on accountability in the specific area of antidiscrim-
ination and diversity. Empirical research demonstrates that 
when decision-makers are enlisted in problem-solving, it has 
much better returns on actually increasing managerial diver-
sity.264 In this way, structural accountability can both increase 
the perception that hiring and promotion is just, and produce 
outcomes that reflect a just state of affairs. 
One specific example of structural accountability is corpo-
rate diversity task forces. The initial idea is to invite department 
heads to volunteer265—not compel anyone’s participation—to 
participate in a committee formulated around a charge of corpo-
rate diversity.266 Once composed, task force members periodi-
cally review diversity numbers for the company, determine 
which departments need attention, and brainstorm solutions to 
achieve their diversity-based goals.267 Other examples of struc-
tural accountability include diversity staff positions, such as a 
diversity manager, and mentoring and training programs that 
pair existing managers with people from different demographic 
groups who hope to ascend the ranks of management.268 While 
most of the EEO policies that companies have implemented to 
spur justice in the form of diversity and antidiscrimination have 
 
 261. Dobbin & Kalev, Diversity Fail, supra note 13, at 58. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. (citing study). 
 264. GREEN, supra note 13, at 136–38; Dobbin & Kalev, Diversity Challenge, 
supra note 14, at 52 (observing that the “antidiscrimination measures that work 
best are those that engage decision makers in solving the problem themselves”); 
Dobbin & Kalev, Diversity Fail, supra note 14, at 58; Fujimoto et al., supra note 
211, at 159. 
 265. Dobbin & Kalev, Diversity Fail, supra note 14, at 58. 
 266. See infra Part III.A.3 (discussing the importance of freedom of choice). 
 267. Dobbin & Kalev, Diversity Fail, supra note 14, at 58. 
 268. See generally Dobbin & Kalev, Diversity Challenge, supra note 14 (dis-
cussing these examples); Dobbin & Kalev, Diversity Fail, supra note 14 (same); 
Fujimoto et al., supra note 211 (same); Kalev et al., supra note 182 (same). 
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“failed spectacularly,” structural accountability, as embodied in 
diversity task forces, diversity staff positions, mentoring pro-
grams, and management training, has been effective as an em-
pirical matter.269 
The general success of structural accountability stems from 
several basic phenomena. First, these programs all facilitate 
contact among women, racial minorities, and white men—some 
of whom might not otherwise interact.270 This contact alone is 
valuable in mitigating the effects of in-group preference and be-
cause it further humanizes people who might be seen as differ-
ent. Second, these programs will naturally enlist people who 
might otherwise not care about diversity, but who enjoy solving 
problems and have access to resources, such as time, money, and 
personnel.271 Building broader coalitions of these kinds is critical 
to fighting discrimination.272 Third, having policies and people 
in place that foster corporate accountability helps to actually 
halt some amount of discrimination. The studies on accountabil-
ity are clear that people are less likely to exercise bias when they 
expect their decisions will be reviewed.273 Curbing discrimina-
tion frequently takes purposeful effort, and structural accounta-
bility makes it much more likely that people will be self-con-
scious enough to make that purposeful effort. In sum, 
accountability is one of the most promising values for ensuring 
justice due in part to its demonstrated potential to deter discrim-
ination in the managerial ranks. 
 
 269. Dobbin & Kalev, Diversity Fail, supra note 14, at 60. For example, com-
panies that implemented diversity task forces have seen increases of 9% to 30% 
in the representation of white women and racial minority group members in 
management over the next five years. Id. 
 270. See Jared B. Kenworthy et al., Intergroup Contact: When Does It Work 
and Why?, in ON THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE, FIFTY YEARS AFTER ALLPORT 279 
(John Dovidio et al. eds., 2005) (noting the elements of “remedial contact” as 
involving equal status, common goals, institutional support, and a perception of 
similarity between the two groups); Chad Trulson & James M. Marquart, The 
Caged Melting Pot: Toward an Understanding of the Consequences of Desegre-
gation in Prisons, 36 L. & SOC’Y REV. 743, 745 (2002) (discussing the contact 
hypothesis). 
 271. Dobbin & Kalev, Diversity Fail, supra note 14, at 60; Fujimoto et al., 
supra note 211, at 159. 
 272. See Lisa Legault et al., supra note 15, at 1476 (profiling aggressive cam-
paigns to stamp out bias and showing that such strategies are prone to elicit “a 
reflexive, reactive effect that increase[s] prejudice”). 
 273. GREEN, supra note 13, at 137. 
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3. Freedom of Choice 
Whether it is wellness programs, diversity training, or com-
mittee assignments, employees’ freedom to choose will dramati-
cally influence how they will feel about the activity. This feeling 
stems from what behavioral economists call a “choice-supportive 
bias,” in which people tend to feel positively about the things 
they have chosen and less positively about things they have not 
chosen.274 Similarly, people often rebel against perceived efforts 
to control them.275 When employees are free to choose, they are 
more likely to feel that the resulting state of affairs is a just 
one.276 Simply put, there is a clearly defined relationship both 
between choice and fairness as well as one between no choice and 
unfairness.277 
The potential problem with freedom of choice is that an em-
ployer will naturally tend to direct the activities of its employees 
when they are at work. The employer may need one employee on 
a particular committee, feel it is necessary for another employee 
to attend diversity training, or expect a third employee to partic-
ipate fully in the wellness program. Nevertheless, behavioral sci-
ence on the topic of choice is clear: failure to give employees a 
choice about whether to participate will make them feel worse 
 
 274. See Kristen Stoll Benney & Linda A. Henkel, The Role of Free Choice in 
Memory for Past Decisions, 14 MEMORY 1001, 1002 (2006) (recounting studies 
that validate “choice-supportive memory distortion”). 
 275. Dobbin & Kalev, Diversity Challenge, supra note 14, at 50; see, e.g., 
GREEN, supra note 13, at 114 (noting that “requiring supervisors to rely on de-
tailed rubrics for selecting promotion candidates can backfire as managers rebel 
against perceived bureaucratic control”). 
 276. See Dobbin & Kalev, Diversity Challenge, supra note 14, at 50–51; 
Legault et al., supra note 15, at 1476 (observing that workplace interventions 
that eliminate choice “may incite hostility toward the perceived source of the 
pressure”). 
 277. See, e.g., Edward L. Deci & Richard M. Ryan, Facilitating Optimal Mo-
tivation and Psychological Well-Being Across Life’s Domains, 49 CANADIAN PSY-
CHOL. 14, 19 (2008) (summarizing a variety of field experiments in which the 
autonomy of employees was predictive of their trust in the organization). The 
importance of choice also helps explain the robust literature that has developed 
around nudges over the last twenty years. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Gentle 
Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 
607, 607–08 (2000) (arguing lawmakers can use nudges to overcome the diffi-
culty of changing social norms); Cass R. Sunstein, The Storrs Lectures: Behav-
ioral Economics and Paternalism, 122 YALE L.J. 1826, 1829–36 (2013) (arguing 
market failures justify legal paternalism in the form of nudging). 
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about the organization.278 If “you catch more flies with honey 
than vinegar,” perceived choice is honey to employees, making 
them more likely to embrace whatever decision or task it is they 
have selected. 
The issue of choice is so important that even policies that 
are intended to help employees can feel unjust if the workers do 
not perceive an option regarding whether to participate. Take 
wellness programs, for example. An employer-provided wellness 
plan is a programmatic effort to encourage employees to make 
healthier choices.279 But when wellness programs are required, 
or the financial incentive to participate is too substantial to pass 
up, workers resist.280 Even if the incentive ought to rationally 
compel everyone to participate and achieve better health, some 
will inevitably feel that a wellness plan is overbearing or un-
just.281 
 
 278. Dobbin & Kalev, Diversity Challenge, supra note 14, at 50 (“Job-auton-
omy research finds that people resist external controls on their thoughts and 
behavior and perform poorly in their jobs when they lack autonomy.”). 
 279. Jessica L. Roberts & Leah R. Fowler, How Assuming Autonomy May 
Undermine Wellness Programs, 27 HEALTH MATRIX: J. L.-MED. 101, 102 (2017). 
Wellness programs implement various strategies, such as individual and group 
challenges, that promote healthy behaviors and produce a “positive herd men-
tality.” Jessica L. Roberts, Nudge-Proof: Distributive Justice and the Ethics of 
Nudging, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1055 (2018). 
 280. In fact, a group of older workers who were concerned largely about pri-
vacy and civil rights challenged the amount of incentive (30% of the cost of cov-
erage under the plan) that was allowed under the EEOC’s regulations sanction-
ing voluntary wellness programs. AARP v. EEOC, 267 F. Supp. 3d 14, 37 
(D.D.C. 2017), on reconsideration, 292 F. Supp. 3d 238 (D.D.C. 2017). The EEOC 
officially rescinded these regulations, which had expressly permitted the volun-
tary incentive of up to 30%, in December of 2018. Ryan Golden, EEOC Rescinds 
Wellness Regulations Ahead of Sunset Date, HR DIVE (Dec. 20, 2018), https:// 
www.hrdive.com/news/eeoc-rescinds-wellness-regulations-ahead-of-sunset 
-date/544866/ [https://perma.cc/E9DH-G4FW]. 
 281. See, e.g., Press Release, AARP, Statement by AARP Exec. Vice Presi-
dent Nancy LeaMond on EEOC Workplace Wellness Program Rules (May 16, 
2016), https://press.aarp.org/2016-05-16-Statement-by-AARP-EVP-Nancy 
-LeaMond-on-EEOC-Workplace-Wellness-Program-Rules [https://perma.cc/ 
2CT4-C7Y5] (“Older workers in particular are more likely to have the very types 
of less visible medical conditions and disabilities—such as diabetes, heart dis-
ease, and cancer—that are at risk of disclosure by wellness questionnaires and 
exams. By financially coercing employees into surrendering their personal 
health information, these rules will weaken medical privacy and civil rights pro-
tections.”). 
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Consider, as well, the idea of diversity training. Diversity 
training may intuitively seem as though it can produce both jus-
tice and perceptions of justice. After all, such trainings often help 
employees value difference and, when done well, can foster the 
sentiment that each employee is uniquely valuable and worthy 
of equitable treatment. Nonetheless, mandatory diversity train-
ing—a common stratagem—is unhelpful.282 Not only is such 
training generally unsuccessful in broadening perspectives,283 it 
also causes majority group members to fear they will be treated 
unfairly.284 In short, mandating participation or involvement 
can cause employees to resist, undercutting their sense that the 
workplace is fair; in contrast, allowing employees to select their 
involvement in non-essential policies or programs is a low-cost 
way of furthering an organizationally just climate.  
B. IMPLEMENTING ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE 
This Article’s contention is that legal and policy mandates 
have failed to effectively deter discrimination—and in part for 
this reason, we must consider alternative, non-coercive ap-
proaches.285 One might then naturally wonder: what exactly can 
be done to ensure and measure Organizational Justice? As ex-
plained above, it is beyond the scope of this Article to detail par-
ticular policies that ought to be adopted by all employers.286 
While the values set out in the previous section lay the ground-
work for the types of policies that will further justice in the work-
place, they do not tell any particular actor what specifically to 
 
 282. See Dobbin & Kalev, Diversity Challenge, supra note 14, at 52 (“Em-
ployers mandate training in the belief that people hostile to the message will 
not attend voluntarily, but if we are right, forcing them to come will do more 
harm than good.”). 
 283. See id. at 49 (showing through a meta-analysis of 426 studies on an-
tibias training that any effects were weak and dissipated within days). 
 284. Id. at 50 (noting “[w]hites generally feel they will not be treated fairly 
in workplaces” that emphasize or compel diversity). 
 285. See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 15, at 1903 (showing aggressive legal 
strategies may backfire when it comes to implicit bias); Eyer, supra note 9, at 
1279–80 (noting proposals to broaden the legal doctrines of antidiscrimination 
laws may “exacerbate the documented tensions between prevailing public views 
and available claims”); Legault et al., supra note 15, at 1476 (demonstrating 
“that strategies urging people to comply with antiprejudice standards are worse 
than doing nothing at all” and that “social control elicited a reflexive, reactive 
effect that increased prejudice”). 
 286. Supra notes 238–41 (explaining why it might be unhelpful to gin up a 
“list of ready to go, discrete measures that can be implemented across all organ-
izations”). 
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do. Nevertheless, this Section will consider the relative merits of 
pay transparency. Additionally, Organizational Justice provides 
important clues about how employers may be persuaded to cre-
ate more just workplace climates. 
1. Firm Interest 
An indispensable part of educating employers must involve 
convincing them that it is in their own best interest to make 
workplaces more just. Fortunately, there is compelling evidence 
that policies advancing justice perceptions not only serve the 
public interest, but also the interests of the firm; evidence indi-
cates that an organizationally just climate increases retention, 
efficiency, and productivity.287 But why exactly do just organiza-
tions advance the bottom line? 
The answer lies at least partly in social exchange theory, in 
which parties calculate how to behave toward one another in 
light of the anticipated costs and benefits.288 In the work context, 
there is evidence that when individuals “receive economic and 
socioemotional resources from their organization, they feel 
obliged to respond in kind and repay the organization.”289 In par-
ticular, one of the most profound ways for an employee to re-
spond to an organization is to vary their level of engagement and 
job performance.290 When the engagement is high, an employee 
will devote greater amounts of cognitive, emotional, and physical 
resources to their job.291 
One of the many social exchanges or inputs that can influ-
ence employees is perceived fairness in managerial practices. 
Fair treatment signifies respect and communicates support for 
employees.292 Thus, when employees perceive an organization’s 
 
 287. E.g., Andrew Li et al., Fairness at the Unit Level: Justice Climate, Jus-
tice Climate Strength, and Peer Justice, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE IN 
THE WORKPLACE, supra note 19, at 137; Devon Proudfoot & E. Allan Lind, Fair-
ness Heuristic Theory, the Uncertainty Management Model, and Fairness at 
Work, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 19, at 
371. 
 288. Social Exchange Theory, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Social_exchange_theory [https://perma.cc/GS6M-P8TY]. 
 289. Alan M. Saks, Antecedents and Consequences of Employee Engagement, 
21 J. MANAG. PSYCH. 600, 603 (2006). 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. 
 292. Gauri S. Rai, Organizational Justice and Quality of Working Life: A 
Road That Leads to a Virtuous Organization, 41 J. SOC. SERV. RES. 269, 287 
(2015). 
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management and policies are just or fair, they reciprocate or re-
pay the employer with better job performance and commit-
ment.293 The logical extension of such repayment is greater 
productivity, and less absenteeism and turnover.294 As such, 
there are profit-serving reasons for employers to actively seek 
justice in the workplace. 
2. Educating Employers 
Employers must also be educated about the antidiscrimina-
tion benefits of an organizationally just climate, and advocacy 
groups are likely in the best position to do that work. In particu-
lar, advocacy groups might develop specific policy recommenda-
tions that are based upon empirical evidence and urge employers 
to adopt them.295 In the current political climate, we see in-
stances of this already happening. One example is the National 
Women’s Law Center, which has effectively pressured employers 
to adopt reforms in the areas of fairer work schedules, pay eq-
uity, and sexual harassment.296 In the Organizational Justice 
space, human resource professionals and organizations like the 
Society for Human Resource Management (SHRM) are likely the 
most effective actors to transmit justice-laden, workplace re-
forms to the national business community.297 As alluded to al-
ready, one of the possible benefits to Organizational Justice is 
 
 293. Cho, supra note 228, at 177; see supra note 287. 
 294. Rai, supra note 292, at 287. 
 295. Sturm, supra note 53, at 463, 520–21, 565. 
 296. See Workplace, NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., https://nwlc.org/issue/ 
workplace/ [https://perma.cc/FH9V-CPMG] (providing an overview of their ad-
vocacy efforts); see, e.g., Press Release, Nat’l Women’s Law Ctr., NWLC Calls To 
Investigate Sexual Assault Allegations Against Justin Fairfax (Feb. 22, 2019), 
https://nwlc.org/press-releases/nwlc-calls-to-investigate-sexual-assault 
-allegations-against-justin-fairfax/ [https://perma.cc/R2AH-2UJF]; Press Re-
lease, Nat’l Women’s Law Ctr., NWLC Applauds Introduction of the Raise the 
Wage Act (Jan. 16, 2019), https://nwlc.org/press-releases/nwlc-applauds 
-introduction-of-the-raise-the-wage-act/ [https://perma.cc/786Z-WQPL]; Press 
Release, Nat’l Women’s Law Ctr., Wage Gap for Women Does Not Budge for 
Two Years in a Row, Being a Woman Still Increases the Odds of Being Poor in 
America, and Number of People Insured Holds Steady (Sept. 12, 2018), https:// 
nwlc.org/press-releases/wage-gap-women-does-not-budge-being-woman 
-increases-odds-of-being-poor-america/ [https://perma.cc/27G9-58FN]; Press Re-
lease, Nat’l Women’s Law Ctr., Walmart Must Face Pregnancy Discrimination 
Class Action (Mar. 29, 2018), https://nwlc.org/press-releases/walmart-must 
-face-pregnancy-discrimination-class-action/ [https://perma.cc/7J3E-EART]. 
 297. See SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., https://www.shrm.org [https:// 
perma.cc/G2GG-M3TC]. 
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that it is a broad enough frame to serve the interests of diverse 
constituencies, such as groups advocating on behalf of women, 
racial minorities, and the LGBTQ community. More than that, 
justice is a “big tent” that even majority group members can get 
behind—especially when the justice-oriented policies are iden-
tity-neutral. In this way, the research on Organizational Justice 
provides a way to transcend the culture wars—after all, who’s 
opposed to justice?—and still seek change in the workplace that 
will benefit disadvantaged populations the most.298 
Employers could likely be persuaded, based upon the data 
marshalled by this Article, that Organizational Justice is a use-
ful approach to a seemingly intractable set of problems flowing 
from bias and patterns of discrimination. In particular, Organi-
zational Justice offers two prime advantages as a tool of antidis-
crimination. First, and most fundamentally, Organizational Jus-
tice intervenes before people engage in discrimination. This early 
stage of intervention means that it targets both conscious and 
unconscious biases,299 and that it can deter the exercise of bias 
before people are actually injured. By preventing discrimination, 
Organizational Justice avoids altogether such cognitive barriers 
as disbelieving discrimination or an unwillingness to label be-
havior as “harassment.”  
Legal scholars are often fixated on whether antidiscrimina-
tion laws are “working,” by which we mean that people can sue, 
survive summary judgment, and prevail upon their claims. But 
securing settlements or winning lawsuits is not the goal of anti-
discrimination laws—the point is to reduce or even prevent dis-
crimination from occurring in the first place. Further to the 
point, most plaintiffs do not want a lawsuit; they want to not 
experience discrimination.300 Given the data showing that Or-
ganizational Justice can help deter discrimination, employers 
ought to embrace strategies that maximize justice. 
Second, Organizational Justice advances nondiscrimination 
in a way that avoids the usual detriments that accompany ex-
plicit efforts to address bias for a whole host of reasons.301 As 
 
 298. See supra Part II.A (discussing how workplace injustices disproportion-
ately impact women and racial minorities).  
 299. Cf. Roberts, supra note 178, at 2155 (making a similar argument about 
privacy). 
 300. Thanks to Katie Eyer for raising several of these incisive points. 
 301. See supra notes 64–68, 220, 282–84 and infra note 325 and accompany-
ing text (detailing the various ways in which industry efforts to advance diver-
sity or address bias have failed). 
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noted in the introduction, strategies such as diversity or antibias 
training may have perverse effects, such as activating stereo-
types, increasing “moral licensing,” and undermining people’s 
senses of “autonomy, competence, relatedness, and basic good-
ness”—causing such programs to backfire.302 Organizational 
Justice thus offers a menu of “cooler” policies that can operate in 
the background and foster justice without generating the ani-
mosity that can sometimes undermine progress for disadvan-
taged groups.303  
3. Measuring Success 
A critical piece in implementing Organizational Justice in-
volves measuring success. One might naturally wonder how an 
employer will know when it has achieved a more just climate. 
One way to measure Organizational Justice is to systematically 
and periodically survey employees on measures of distributive, 
procedural, and informational justice. There are a number of em-
pirical studies on Organizational Justice that provide a window 
into the types of questions one might raise. For example, con-
sider the statements and questions in Figure 1 (below), taken 
from a study on managerial efforts to establish fair practices. 
The statements and questions are non-exhaustive, but provide a 
useful starting point in considering how employers might at-
tempt to measure change in the amount of perceived justice 
within an organization. 
  
 
 302. See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text. 
 303. Eyer, supra note 9, at 1361 (advocating a “‘cooler’ approach—by its na-
ture designed to avoid the pursuit of moral victories” as the best means to “im-
prov[e] outcomes for individual victims of discrimination”). 
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Figure 1. 
Survey Questions and Statements that Measure the Man-
agerial Dimension of Organizational Justice304  
 
Distributive justice  
• Promotions in my work unit are based on merit. 
• Pay raises depend on how well employees perform their 
jobs. 
• Awards in my work unit depend on how well employees 
perform their jobs. 
Procedural justice  
• Complaints, disputes, or grievances are resolved fairly in 
my work unit. 
• Arbitrary action, personal favoritism, and coercion for 
partisan political purposes are not tolerated. 
• Prohibited personnel practices are not tolerated. 
• I can disclose a suspected violation of any law, rule, or 
regulation without fear of reprisal. 
Informational justice  
• Managers communicate the goals and priorities of the or-
ganization.  
• Managers promote communication among different work 
units (for example, about projects, goals, needed re-
sources). 
• How satisfied are you with the information you receive 
from management on what’s going on in your organiza-
tion? 
 
One might naturally question whether there is a problem-
atic tension between what people perceive as just and what is 
actually just.305 For example, one might perceive that a state of 
affairs is just, but in fact it is not. Conversely, an unfair situation 
may be overlooked or go unrecognized. This is a natural tension 
between certain sub-species of organizational justice. For exam-
ple, there might not be distributive justice (by any reasonable 
measure), but an organizational environment might be high on 
procedural justice, producing a general perception of fairness. 
The question is ultimately not whether there is true justice, in 
 
 304. Cho, supra note 228, at 181. 
 305. Of course, this concern begs the question of what one might consider to 
be true or actual justice—or how we might measure it. “Justice” is both a 
fraught and contested term. 
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some epistemic sense, but whether people within an organiza-
tion believe there is justice across distributive, procedural, and 
informational factors. Organizational Justice cannot solve all 
problems, which may include not producing actual justice in 
some instances. Even so, this Article has contended that proce-
dural justice is often a strong start toward the justice produced 
by successful antidiscrimination efforts. Procedural justice can, 
as explained in Part II, prevent discrimination and increase in-
ternal reports of harassment in many instances. 
4. An Example: Pay Transparency 
One specific policy extension of Organizational Justice is 
found in making wages more transparent. In recent years, there 
has been a push by both politicians and activists for mandated 
pay transparency.306 The basic idea is that Congress could pass 
an omnibus federal law that requires employers to make wages 
more transparent and provide better remedies and protections 
for employees who oppose pay discrimination.307 But Organiza-
tional Justice may be challenging to achieve through legal man-
dates of this sort.308 Many state entities are already required by 
 
 306. The Paycheck Fairness Act, which would require employers to make 
wages more transparent and prohibit retaliation for employees who raise con-
cerns about discriminatory compensation, has been reintroduced in every Con-
gress dating back to 1997. Paycheck Fairness Act, WIKIPEDIA, https://en 
.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paycheck_Fairness_Act [https://perma.cc/FM8N-NVUK]. 
For more analysis on the merits of pay transparency, see BERREY ET AL., supra 
note 42, at 272 (arguing for a system of mandated disclosure of demographic 
and wage data) and Cynthia Estlund, Extending the Case for Workplace Trans-
parency to Information About Pay, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 781 (2014) (analyzing 
the potential costs and benefits of pay transparency and concluding, on balance, 
that such transparency would result in a fairer and less discriminatory econ-
omy).  
 307. Paycheck Fairness Act, supra note 306. 
 308. This Article has contended that coercive approaches to addressing dis-
crimination have generally been unsuccessful and are not the best path forward. 
Supra Part I (discussing the failure of antidiscrimination law); see also supra 
notes 283–84 and infra note 325 and accompanying text (discussing the failure 
of EEO policies that require employees to do something). The approach of simply 
trying to legislate change evokes the “Law of the Instrument,” under which peo-
ple tend to rely on familiar instruments in lieu of searching out the best tools 
for intractable problems. See generally Law of the Instrument, WIKIPEDIA, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_of_the_instrument [https://perma.cc/8S9C 
-YWLN]. Since point source-style legislation has been generally ineffective, we 
ought to instead focus on seeking justice in the workplace by attacking discrim-
ination indirectly. 
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law to disclose salary information to the public. A public em-
ployee may be more likely to see this disclosure as legal compli-
ance than as evidence that their employer is particularly just. 
A more tailored approach would be the rule that President 
Obama advanced in 2016, requiring companies with 100 or more 
employees to report their pay scales broken down by sex and 
race.309 The EEOC has always required large companies to re-
port the job titles of their workers by sex and race; Obama simply 
expanded these existing requirements to include pay data. None-
theless, the rule was subsequently stayed by the Trump Admin-
istration.310 In March of 2019, a federal judge gave the proposed 
rule life again, finding that the stay was unwarranted and that 
the pay scale disclosure rule could go forward.311 But critics have 
argued that this rule does not go far enough because the data 
will only be disclosed to regulators and not the public.312 
A more promising, and less coercive, alternative would be 
for federal or state legislatures to create economic incentives. For 
example, instead of legislating pay transparency, Congress could 
craft tax inducements for companies that make compensation 
data publicly available. This might accomplish less overall trans-
parency, but it would increase the likelihood that something ac-
tually gets passed. After all, few companies currently provide 
pay transparency,313 which suggests they would prefer not to do 
 
 309. Daniel Wiessner, Judge Says Trump Administration Improperly 
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so.314 Coaxing—instead of mandating—pay transparency would 
also engender less resentment from the business community and 
those on the high end of the salary scale, whose salaries are most 
likely to be affected, by disguising the prod as a carrot. It is also 
more likely that employees will admire such a step if it is not 
taken under the duress of legal mandate. 
Still, to talk about justice flowing from pay transparency is 
complicated. Transparency in earnings would certainly give em-
ployees a chance to assess whether they are victims of pay dis-
crimination, which could also deter future sex- or race-based 
compensation disparities.315 However, laying bare employment 
compensation in the private sector would also cause jealousy and 
resentment—at least in the short term.316 It could even elevate 
the overall amount of felt injustice,317 especially since wage com-
pression is often a byproduct of salaries being made public.318 
However, the argument about transparency’s effect on justice 
perceptions is knotty. To answer that question, one would have 
to counter-factualize how employees will feel after learning ac-
tual salaries and compare that information to what they cur-
rently suspect or fear.319 Perceptions of injustice could be greater 
under the current, more secretive state of affairs.320 
All told, the argument that pay transparency would increase 
justice through antidiscrimination is compelling. Some commen-
tators have even argued that pay transparency is the most direct 
route to closing the gender wage gap.321 After all, when salaries 
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are kept secret, pay inequity between sexes or races is typically 
undetectable. Countries such as Denmark and Britain have 
found that pay transparency reduced the gender wage gap in 
part by slowing men’s salary growth and in part by compressing 
employees’ wages.322 In the United States, both unions and the 
public sector—where compensation is typically transparent and 
reveals smaller disparities between different races and sexes—
provides more evidence of this relationship.323 Moreover, a pay 
scale disclosure rule would give the public access to industry-
wide phenomena—data that could arm victims of wage discrim-
ination with robust evidence for litigation.324 The issue of pay 
transparency is just one example of an Organizational Justice-
minded policy, and it illustrates how an employer can increase 
justice, and fight discrimination, without hewing to the well-
worn and frequently ineffectual EEO industry path.325 
C. Addressing Counter-Arguments and Concerns 
One general argument that might be leveled against Organ-
izational Justice is that it is just another form of “new govern-
ance,” in which organizations are encouraged to self-govern in 
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lieu of top-down regulation.326 Some legal scholars have noted 
the utility of governance-based approaches to social issues. For 
example, Cynthia Estlund has observed that the turn to govern-
ance is a by-product of two realities: that “powerful dynamics 
and incentives operating within regulated organizations and 
networks can either frustrate or advance societal objectives; and 
that direct regulation is not always the best way of channeling 
those organizational dynamics in a socially productive direc-
tion.”327 But others have argued against governance-based ap-
proaches, worrying that organizations will engage in a type of 
symbolic compliance that treats legal objectives as business 
goals instead of moral imperatives.328 These arguments have 
merit and warrant response. In the civil rights context, the ar-
gument against new governance can be distilled into three risks: 
(1) the risk that without legal enforcement, businesses will not 
self-police; (2) the risk that the policies employers choose will be 
ineffective; and (3) the risk that such policies will “managerial-
ize” moral imperatives.329 
One concern with “new governance” policies is that when 
employers are not forced to act, they may well do nothing. First, 
as detailed above, advancing justice simultaneously advances 
the firm’s interest through increasing the level of employees’ en-
gagement, which in turn, can increase workplace efficiency and 
reduce workplace absenteeism and turnover. The empirical data 
is strong that just organizations persuade employees to remain 
loyal and engage in productive behaviors. Moreover, as discussed 
in Part II, policies that foster justice can decrease discrimination 
and increase the representation of disadvantaged constituen-
cies, which in turn may help organizations rightly avoid legal 
liability.330 Organizational Justice is thus a partial answer to le-
gal scholars like Susan Sturm and Tristen Green, who have 
called for organizations to get more creative in devising solutions 
that minimize discrimination and further the promotion of 
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women and minorities.331 Ultimately, as noted above, justice can 
be a powerful framing device, making Organizational Justice 
both a politically and socially agreeable means of furthering an-
tisubordination.332  
A second argument against “new governance” approaches is 
that the policies a business enacts such as grievance procedures 
or diversity trainings may turn out to be wholly ineffective, and 
yet the organization is nonetheless credited by courts and the 
public as being attentive to antidiscrimination values.333 Schol-
ars have argued that the presence of symbolic structures may 
have an “anchoring effect” for judges: once they learn that these 
structures are in place, they are more likely to form an initial 
assessment that the employer is complying with civil rights laws 
and are less likely to give weight to subsequent evidence showing 
otherwise.334 One elegant feature of Organizational Justice is 
that it does not directly relate to discrimination and is thus not 
an obvious EEO reform. Accordingly, judges would be unlikely 
to deem reforms flowing from a commitment to fairness as rele-
vant to antidiscrimination litigation. Further, any time an or-
ganization installs policies—of any kind—they may turn out to 
be ineffective. But all of these facts form an argument in favor of 
distinguishing between those policies that achieve substantive 
justice versus those that are merely symbolic—not an argument 
against implementing justice-oriented reforms altogether.335 
A third possible concern is that Organizational Justice may 
function as a shortcut around bias in which the moral focus on 
eliminating prejudice gets lost. The idea is that indirect ap-
proaches can minimize the “moral valence” of fighting discrimi-
nation.336 For example, instead of using their inherent influence 
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to act on a positive moral duty, organizations may relegate such 
duties to policy; that is, they create a space for antidiscrimina-
tion apart from appreciating it as a moral imperative. The best 
response to this argument is that employment discrimination 
law as currently constituted offers few victories—moral, eco-
nomic, or otherwise.337 Given that most legal policies are failing 
to combat discrimination, innovative approaches to furthering 
antidiscrimination should be embraced—even while advocates 
simultaneously campaign for legal reform. Additionally, as ex-
plained above, most policy efforts that are focused directly on 
bias are, according to empirical research, failing.338 More to the 
point, organizations could still adopt Organizational Justice re-
forms with antidiscrimination goals in mind—and an awareness 
that traditional civil rights reforms have not worked. Organiza-
tional Justice need not signal a lack of commitment to fighting 
discrimination, and indeed could become a hallmark of commit-
ment to antidiscrimination values if it comes to be seen as more 
effective.339 Accordingly, employers should be quick to adopt and 
embrace policies that can further substantive equality—and 
benefit both worker and firm alike—through an emphasis on jus-
tice. 
CONCLUSION 
Workplace discrimination is persistent, and current employ-
ment discrimination law and policy do not sufficiently address 
it. The best available evidence shows that most people who are 
discriminated against at work do not file discrimination claims 
due to a variety of psychological, social, and pragmatic factors. 
Furthermore, even when people do file claims, most are never 
fully litigated, and employers win most of the small percentage 
that are. To address the shortcomings of antidiscrimination law, 
activists need new tools to prevent and reduce discrimination. 
Recent empirical studies have shown that Organizational Jus-
tice may be just the type of meaningful solution needed. Organ-
izational Justice presents an innovative framework for remaking 
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the workplace climate with an eye toward enhancing fairness in 
the workplace. Perhaps most importantly, where current em-
ployment discrimination law and policy’s focus is backward—on 
righting wrongs already done—Organizational Justice aims for-
ward to stop discrimination before it even begins, by addressing 
one of its underlying causes. 
Organizational Justice is a useful addition to the antidis-
crimination toolbox. An organizationally just climate can both 
decrease discrimination and moderate its effects—especially 
with regard to women and minorities, who are disproportion-
ately harmed by workplace discrimination. Organizational Jus-
tice can also help to decrease instances of harassment in the 
workplace and, in the event that harassment still occurs, can in-
crease the likelihood a victim will report it.  
With a problem as complicated as discrimination, there are 
no easy solutions. Employers should take proactive steps to in-
crease employees’ perceptions of justice through implementing 
policies that focus on transparency, accountability, and freedom 
of choice. Crafting policies, practices, and rules with a bent to-
ward fostering justice and perceptions of justice may be just the 
innovative, heterodox approach needed for more adequately ad-
dressing employment discrimination. 
 
